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94th Congress 
2d Session 







November 13, 1975— AIR FORCE 




Printed for the use of the Committee on the Budget 

65-705 o 



EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine, Chairman 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina 
ALAN CRANSTON, California 
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware 
SAM NUNN, Georgia 

J. GLENN BEALL, Jr., Maryland 

Douglas J. Benxet, Jr., Staff Director 
John T. McEvoy, Chief Counsel 
Robert S. Boyd, Minority Staff Director 
Thomas Foxwell, Director of Publications 

Task Force on Defense 
«* ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina, Chairman 



LAWTON CHILES. Florida.-' I 
JAMES ABOUREZK, South Dako'ta 

Michael B. Joy, Task Force Coordinator 






Senator Hollings 1 

Senator Cranston 1 


Jones, Gen. David C, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force 3 

Biography of General Jones 76 


Written questions from Senator Cranston to General Jones and the 

responses 61 

Force data for U.S. Air Force 67 

Brief description of Air Force major acquisition programs 74 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2013 


Air Force Mission and Priorities 


U.S. Senate, 
Task Force ox Defense, 
Committee on the Budget, 

Washington, D.C. 
The task force met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 357, 
Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ernest F. Hollings presiding. 
Present: Senators Hollings, Cranston, and Chiles. 
Staff members present : Michael B. Joy, task force coordinator, and 
Andrew Hamilton, professional staff. 
Senator Hollings. The task force will please come to order. 

Opening Statement of Senator Hollings 

Today we continue our hearings on national defense priorities and 

Our objective in these hearings is to examine the rationale behind 
the Administration's projection of national defense budgets for the 
next 5 years. We will be looking into the policy guidance and planning 
assumptions which shape our military forces, the force requirements 
which result, the key manpower management and modernization 
issues facing the Congress and the Department of Defense in the 
next 5 years, and the budgetary implications of all this. 

Today we have with us General David C. Jones, the Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force, to give us an overview of the Air Force : its 
roles and missions and how the Air Force is divided among them, 
how force requirements are established, and what kind of Air Force 
we will need in the coming decade, and how the Air Force manages 
its resources. 

Senator Hollings. Senator Cranston. 

Opening Statement of Senator Cranston 

Senator Cranston. I have just a brief opening statement to make. 

This week this task force heard testimony from General Weyand, 
Chief of Staff of the Army. He testified about the Army's "essential 
need"' for 2 percent "real growth" — 1 percent in procurement ac- 
counts — over and above inflation increases, for the next several years. 


Earlier, in September, we heard Admiral Holloway, Chief of Naval 
Operations. He indicated a belief that the Navy's budget should in- 
crease by $1.5 billion per year for ship construction alone. In addi- 
tion, he requested another $900 million to $1 billion per year increase 
for personnel to create and operate a 600-ship Navy. 


I expect that today General Jones will want to indicate to us the 
urgent need for real growth in the Air Force budget. The Air Force, I 
understand, plans to increase the number of wings from 22 to 26 by 
1980, resulting in real increases in both personnel and equipment costs 
over and above any inflation. 

The Defense Department has informed us that it must plan for a 2 
percent annual increase in its funding in constant dollars adjusted for 
inflation just to "maintain a stable operational force." 

All of this occurs at a period when the United States is not at war 
anywhere with the base of the first $100 billion defense budget in the 
Nation's history. 

Unlike the temporary expenditures which we have added to the 
budget this year to assist the Nation to recover from a deep recession, 
defense expenditures do not disappear or revert to the private sector 
when the economy has recovered. Instead, they seem endlessly to grow, 
regardless of economic or military conditions in the world. 


Defense expenditures already make up roughly 25 percent of the 
Federal budget. This does not include the $18 billion we pay annually 
for veterans' benefits, or the $36 billion we spend in annual interest 
on the Federal debt, which results primarily from past wars. 

President Ford has requested congressional help in reducing the 
size of the Federal budget. This is an idea not without its attractive- 
ness for all of us. 

I hope that in his testimony today General Jones will be able to 
show us ways to save money from the costs of maintaining the Air 
Force. Or, in the alternative, that he will have suggestions for sav- 
ings from other portions of the military budget. Or. in the absence of 
either of these, that he will tell us how his plans for increasing the 
annual cost of the Air Force — together with the similar plans of the 
Armv and the Navy— will, if adopted, enable us to achieve the goal of 
his Commander in Chief, to reduce the size of the Federal budget. 

I am looking forward to hearing General Jones address these ques- 
tions as he describes the 5-year plans of the Air Force, and I welcome 
him to the Budget Committee Defense Task Force. 

Senator Rollings. General Jones, wo welcome you here today and 
you can proceed as you wish with an opening statement or you can file 
it for the record and summarize it. 

We have on the Budget Committee side informal hearings and more 
or less a group discussion format. I hope the group will show up be- 
fore long. In any event, you won't be wasting your time. I will be 
listening and I want to hear as much as I can hear this morning. 


General Jones. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. 

I do not have a formal prepared statement, but I would like to make 
a few remarks about the Air Force. 

First, I applaud the work of the committee in that I can think of 
nothing more important than working on the long-range plans for 
our country. We in the Air Force do project our 5-year defense pro- 
gram, our specific requirements and then beyond that with extended 
planning on into the next decade. 


With regard to the missionization, which is of great interest to 
people these days, as to our mission and what are our requirements to 
perform that mission, I would break it out for the national security 
overall into four basic areas. 


First and foremost is to maintain the strategic balance in the world, 
equilibrium with the Soviet Union, both real and perceived. The per- 
ception of that balance is very important in addition to the real bal- 
ance from a technical standpoint. 

As Thomas Hobbes said in the 17th century, "Until power is used, 
it is what people think it is." We have programs to modernize our 
strategic force primarily with the B-l. We provide two legs of the 
strategic triad with the intercontinental ballistic missiles and the 
bomber force. So that strategic balance is first. 


Second, would be in concert with our allies to maintain a forward de- 
fense, particularly a good conventional capability so that we can keep 
down the probability or the possibility of having to escalate to nuclear 
weapons in order to protect our interests— to keep that probability as 
low as possible. Of course, much of our effort in the Air Force is in 
this area of providing a conventional capability with our tactical 
fighters, our reconnaissance and other such systems. 


Third, maritime security; maintain the sea lines of communication. 
This is a collateral mission for the Air Force. We do not develop force 
requirement and force structure to help with the sea lines-of -communi- 
cations problem, but we have within the Air Force a great intrinsic 
capability to help in this very important role. Recently Admiral Hol- 
loway. the Chief of Naval Operations, and I signed a memorandum 
of agreement under which we would develop training. 

We have been doing some training, but we want to do it more com- 
prehensively so our crews can be used more efficiently in the sea control 

"See biography of General Jones, beginning at p. 76. 

mission, in the mission of surveillance, and if called upon, the mission 
of destruction, the sinking of ships. 


Fourth would be mobility. There is a very important requirement 
to project forces. A unit stationed in the United States in the general - 
purpose category has very little utility until we can move it to the part 
of the world where it is necessary in an emergency, and hopefully in 
rime to prevent or deter conflict. 

So we put considerable effort on mobility in our airlift, and in our 
airlift enhancement programs to be able to move all services, and 
particularly the large requirements of the U.S .Army. 

Those are the four basic requirements — strategic balance, forward 
defense, lines of communication, and mobility. 


I put a fifth requirement with these and it is sort of like the thumb 
with your fingers, and that is information — intelligence, control, com- 
munications — which makes the other four operative, giving the ability 
to do the other four, and giving you the capabilities for surgical 

Those are basically the five requirement areas that I would outline 
in national security, and where we contribute to all five. 


Xow with regard to our ability to perform these functions. I think 
it is good. We still, in my judgment, are the best Air Force in the 
world today. Our concerns, of course, have been with the erosion of our 
purchasing power. 

Since the Vietnam war — and I will go back before the buildup in 
Vietnam to the more stable period — we have had about a 25-percent 
increase in the Air Force budget in terms of dollars. When you relate 
that to real purchasing power, it is a reduction of about -40 percent. 
That doesn't tell the whole story, because our personnel costs have gone 
up 2y 2 times per person. And although Ave are using half the fuel today 
that we used in 1964. it is costing nearly three times as much money 
in absolute dollars. So when you look at" the increased personnel costs 
beyond inflation and the increased fuel costs, we have had a greater 
increase in the operating area than we have in the others as far as 
requirements are concerned. 

So despite a one-third reduction in people, we have had an increase 
in personnel costs. Thus in funding we have had to take a greater cut 
in our research and development and in investment. In real terms our 
R. & D. is down about 50 percent from 1964. and our procurement in- 
vestments are down about 60 percent. 


I think we have done very well to accommodate this change— this 
reduction of people, the reduction in airplanes which are down by 

many, many thousands, and reductions in procurements — through 
good quality, quality in our systems, and quality in our people. 

Our weapon systems are the best in the world today. In one area 
the United States has a very, very marked advantage over anyone else 
in the world and that is in building airplanes. Everybody wants to fly 
U.S. airplanes, whether they are commercial or military. Our equip- 
ment to go in them is by far the best in the world — the electronic 
equipment, the guided weapons that give us the great precision in ap- 
plication of weapon systems. 

So we have quality in our weapon systems and we have quality in 
our people, very high standards in our people. We only accept a little 
over 20 out of every 100 serious applicants for the Air Force. We have 
a good, large backlog in people applying to be hired, including col- 
lege graduates who want to be officers in the U.S. Air Force. We are in 
a buyer's market as far as personnel are concerned. 

We have been able to accommodate these reductions not only through 
quality, but I believe through some good management initiatives, some 
very significant ones. 

As an example, in airlift, from the start of the Air Force we had 
our airlift aircraft; divided in three categories: the bigger aircraft, 
the strategic, C-5, C-141, which are the long-haul intercontinental; 
the tactical to support mainly the Army in the front lines; and then 
what we call our support aircraft, sometimes called the executive 

We had aircraft in these three categories fragmented in assign- 
ments throughout the world. 

In this last year we have taken all of these aircraft and placed them 
under one commander, the commander of the Military Airlift Com- 
mand. In so doing we have achieved greater efficiency and have been 
able to phase out 400 support aircraft, most of them the executive-type 
aircraft, at a saving of more than 6,000 people, 150,000 gallons of fuel 
a day and $100 million per year. So there is a very significant change 
in how we do airlift and in the number of aircraft involved. 


We have also cut headquarters drastically. The Air Force personnel 
total has come down about one-third since the level period before the 
Vietnam war. We increased for the war and then came down, so we 
are really down about a third from wartime peaks. But our head- 
quarters have come down about 50 percent. We have reduced the 
manning in the Pentagon since the end of 1973 by 20 percent. I believe 
I can reduce my headquarters in the Pentagon and people in the 
Washington area even further and I have an objective of reducing at 
least 5 percent a year. 


We have another initiative in that we have greater reliance on the 
Reserve forces. Today about 60 percent of our continental air defense 

65-705 O - 76 


aircraft is provided by the Reserve forces, primarily the Air National 
Guard in this case. About 30 percent of our tactical fighters and about 
half of our airlift aircraft are in the Reserve forces. 


We are now putting some of the Strategic Air Command mission of 
air refueling into the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard with 
our KO-135 tankers. So we are taking a lot of management actions in- 
ternally to be able to accommodate with many fewer people. 

I believe wo can continue to do more in this area of insuring that 
we get a full dollar return for every person we have in the Air Force. 
We have come a long way. I am proud of what we have done and I 
assure you we have a way to go and we have many, many initiatives in 
the areas of getting greater readiness and greater combat capability 
out of the people and the dollars that are appropriated to us. 

Mr. Chairman, that pretty well completes my statement. 

Senator Hollings. That is an excellent summary. 


With respect to trying to combine not only the airlift capability, I 
noticed you mentioned the tactical phase of it also for a saving of 
manpower, dollars and fuel. Why do we have more or less four or 
five tactical air forces in the U.S. defense complex? Have you looked 
at that with respect to each having their own tactical air force? What 
coordination, combinations, and economies could there be there \ 

Is there any duplication ? 

some duplication 

General Jones. Yes, Mr. Chairman, there is some duplication. Of 
course, all duplication is not necessarily bad. There is very little dupli- 
cation between the Air Force and the Army. When people talk about 
four separate tactical air forces — Army, Xavy. Air Force, and Ma- 
rines — the Air Force and the Army are working much more closely 
today than ever before. 

I don't take credit for it. General Abrams and General Brown 
started this and one of the things that came out of the Vietnam war 
w T as a very close association. So the Army has their armed helicopters 
and we have our close-air-support aircraft and these are very 

I would say in that regard that there is really virtually no duplica- 
tion between the Air Force and the Army. 

With regard to the Xavy and the Marines, there is some degree of 
overlap of mission capability. However, there is a need. When you 
look at the Soviet aircraft — and they outnumber the U.S. aircraft sig- 
nificantly in tactical air in particular — there is a need for the total. 


We are trying to manage better now. We are starting mutual train- 
ing. We have a lot of training, particularly of our technicians, that we 

are starting to dovetail so we don't completely operate two training 

We have a long way to go. but we have made progress in this area. 
We are coming closer together and I think in the next few years we 
will do better than we have in the past. 

Senator Hollixgs. Is there a definite plan within the Air Force or 
the Pentagon for the coordination of these four tactical air forces? I 
know you have heard the criticism. Former Air Force General Barry 
Goldwater says that is one place to save. 


General Jones. Xot to combine, no. sir. but there are actions to insure 
greater coordination and cooperation and integration of effort, but no 
plan to combine the air forces. 


Senator Cranston. Does the Air Force have any plan to adopt a mis- 
sion approach rather than just a plane-by-plane approach? 

General Jones. Yes, sir. We in the Air Force believe we have been 
pioneers in the mission approach and we are totally mission-oriented : 
strategic, tactical, within the general-purpose area, and airlift. 

Senator Cranston. Can that be coordinated with the plans of the 
other services? 

General Jones. We do cordinate. We don't integrate in an opera- 
tional sense, but I would be the first one to say we still have a long 
way to go before we do have a total coordination of this effort. We are 
making progress, but we are not there yet. 


Senator Cranston. As I understand it. the annual operating costs for 
tactical air forces are around $24 billion, or roughly one-quarter of all 
military expenditures. Are there any real ways to coordinate activities 
that would reduce the expense significantly ? 

General Jones. Within that I think they include airlift, which has 
now been virtually integrated since all of the airlift except a few 
support aircraft are now managed by the Air Force. So that is one 
part that we have totally integrated or virtually totally integrated. 
There are savings. We are making savings particularly in the training 
plant. We are bringing it together. We have a long way to go, I agree. 


Senator Cranston. Do you see that $24 billion annual expenditure 
as something that will remain at that level or increase on into the 
future ? 

General Jones. In our projections I would expect that it will re- 
main about level in real terms, which would mean an increase as a re- 
sult of inflation. In tactical air we have deferred modernization a great 
deal. For example, this year in 1975. money was appropriated for 
only 124 aircraft, which is the fewest aircraft purchased since 1940. 


So we have deferred and deferred this modernization and now have 
a need to expand in the investment area. We are trying to cut in the 
operational area so that we can invest in the new systems without 
having a significant increase in total costs. 


Senator Hollings. General Jones, the broad issue that we are con- 
cerned with here, first, of course, is just how the military services 
establish their force requirements and how you put those budgets to- 
gether. What directive — in specific terms — do you receive from the 
National Security Council or does the Secretary of the Air Force draw 
up one set of requirements and the Chief of Staff some other? 

Somehow or other we seem to have a free-for-all in the Pentagon 
as to how you get your force requirements and how they are issued. 
Can you tell the committee something about that? 


General Jones. There is a programing and budget cycle we are in 
every year and we are in the latter stages now of the 1977 budget, 
but essentially the broad guidance comes out of Department of De- 
fense initially. 

This is put out in a draft form. We are able to comment on it by 
services and by the Joint Chiefs. This then forms the framework of 
what our national defense policies will be. what the objectives are. 


The Joint Chiefs of Staff address that guidance and come in with 
recommendations as to force structure and needs. Then there are a 
series of iterations and a general force structure will be developed and 
the services come in with the detailed costing of that force structure. 
Then we will go through an adjustment process because the cost al- 
ways comes in higher — at least in my experience — it comes in higher 
when you add the whole thing together than what is the target or 
what is believed to be the total appropriate target number. Then there 
is a series of decisions made internally in the Department, working 
with OMB, and then we have the budget proposed to the President, 
and then the President's budget is proposed to the Congress. 

So there are many iterations, but it is generally the Department of 
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who are the ones most involved 
in the specific requirements area with the services providing the tech- 
nical inputs and needs to a great extent. 

I am really not too familiar with how other agencies in the Govern- 
ment operate, but I think that we do pretty well particularly in pro- 
jecting our requirements out 5 years. 


Senator Hollings. What are the contingencies against which your 
current forces are planned and sized? Can you give us some idea? 

General Jones. Yes, sir. I would rather not get into specifics, but, in 
general, from a conventional general-purpose standpoint. Europe, and 


our involvement with our NATO allies and the defense of NATO is 
No. 1, while at the same time being able to have some capability 
to contain conflict on a limited basis in another part of the world, in 
case it breaks out. 

But we are not talking about two major wars at one time since one 
would be a smaller one. That is, in the general-purpose area, how we 
develop our force requirements. 


Senator Hollixgs. With regard to NATO how do you see the role 
of the Air Force in the event of, let's say, a war between NATO and the 
Warsaw Pact? 


General Jones. There is some misinformation around as to what the 
Air Force's supposed objectives are. There are some who have said 
that we are out to win an air battle and do deep interdiction, going 
deep into East Germany and into Poland. But that is incorrect. 

The objective of NATO is to keep from losing NATO territory. 
Therefore, our primary requirements over there would be to help blunt 
an attack, particularly an armored breakthrough. In doing that we 
would be providing support to the Army both in attacking targets, and 
overhead in trying to provide some degree of local air superiority — to 
keep the enemy from attacking our forces, providing information, par- 
ticularly in the area as to where possible breakthroughs would be, and 
hitting the enemy in the interdiction role but right over the hill, right 
behind his main forces as opposed to deep in his territory. 

So we see our primary requirement is to prevent the loss of NATO 
territory, which is really the objective of the NATO alliance. 


Senator Hollings. How about if in the first 3 weeks you had bad 
weather? What effect would that have on the defense posture of the 
Air Force? 

General Jones. It would have an impact on us; but it would have a 
greater impact on the Warsaw Pact air force. We have a better all- 
weather capability than the Warsaw Pact has. So both air forces would 
be affected, but so would the ground situation. If it is bad weather, it 
probably includes a lot of rain. 

Having spent many years in Europe, I know it is much more diffi- 
cult for the tanks to operate through the areas in very wet weather. 
So all forces would be affected, but we in the NATO air forces would 
be affected less than the Warsaw Pact air forces. 


Senator Hollings. You were talking about the airlift to reinforce 
NATO rapidly. Is that complete and dependable now with the C-5A 
considering all the problems with the wing. Could you resupply in a 
matter of davs? What is the number of troops that would be needed 
and so forth ? 



General Jones. Yes. sir, we have a very (rood capability to resupply 
in comparison with the past. However, when you look at the objectives 
of the amount of tonnage and the amount of people we must get to 
Europe, it is in the cargo area that we have a deficiency in being able to 
get the number that is stated in the requirements— of moving the 
Army to Europe in the first 30 days. It is a very substantial capability. 
but it is well short, and that is why we have an airlift enhancement 
program including greater use of commercial aircraft. 

We have a great passenger-carrying capability with commercial 
aircraft, but we are looking to improve the commercial cargo-carrying 
capability, and there are hearings before the House Armed Services 
Committee today on this very subject of what is the best way to en- 
hance airlift. Our airlift capability is significant, but not ali that is 


Senator Hollixgs. On those areas would it be more cost -efficient to 
build a new generation of military tanker cargo planes or to modify the 
existing civilian aircraft such as the 747? Have you testified on that or 
what is the position of the Air Force? 

General Jones. We think that the best is a mix with some tanker 
cargo aircraft because in the tanker role it can make the C-5 far 
more efficient. We can refuel the C-5 and refuel at great distances with 
tanker cargo aircraft, while the 747, even modified, will not be able to 
do what the C-5 can do, at least in the modifications we are talking 

It won't carry the tanks and the big stuff. So we need a very limited 
number of tanker cargo aircraft to be able to enhance our current air- 
lift force — the number to be provided at low cost. Also, we would 
modify commercial airplanes — a larger number of wide-body 


Senator Hollixgs. I think it was after the Yom Kippur war the 
Department of Defense assembled a team to assess what lessons were 
learned and determined that the low-speed aircraft couldn't survive in 
the modern-day battle environment. 

My point or question goes to the A-10 which is limited to about 350 
knots. With that role as you describe it. let me hear your comments 
on that A-10. 

General Jones. The A-10 is specifically designed, as you know, to 
provide the Army close air support. As far as survival is concerned, 
we have made it a very hard airplane. It can take many, many rounds 
of fire from the ground before it will be knocked down. It is a very 
sturdy airplane. The problem we have had with other aircraft in that 
environment is the lack of armor. 

What I am really saying is that speed can gain you some pro- 
tection as can armor. We plan to have flares to counter the infrared 
missiles that are fired. We believe that properly used, the A-10 can 
survive and operate in close air support with the Army and can 
do a good job. 



Senator Hollixgs. And you think it does have sufficient speed to 
sustain it? 

General Jones. Not so much the speed as the armor and the flares 
and eountermeasures. If you are slow and you have no armor and 
no eountermeasures, the vulnerability would be fairly high. That 
was the problem in the Yom Kippur war, in which some aircraft 
were operated slow and had no protection. 


Senator Hollings. Are there some structural stress problems witn 
the A-10? 

General Jones. No serious problems. In one of our fatigue tests at 
about 80 percent of the life of the airplane, we had some cracks in the 
wing joint area. We have come up with a fix for that. It will be put 
into all the aircraft. 

We have asked an independent review group to take a look to make 
sure that our fix is right. We are confident it is, but we want to make 
sure it is right. We think there is no serious problem with the A-10. 


Senator Hollings. What was the original projected unit pro- 
curement cost for the A-10. and what do you estimate it now to be 
with these adjustments ? 

General Jones. These adjustments should not have any significant 
cost impact. I think it is just a few thousand dollars in modifica- 
tion for the aircraft that are already down the line. 

In 1970 dollars, the A-10 was projected at about $1.5 million 
average unit flyaway cost. If we now, in accordance with the normal 
practices, take everything back to 1970 dollars, I believe we are at 
about $1.9 million, roughly. When you take into consideration the 
cost of initial spares and peculiar support and inflation, the procure- 
ment cost of the program is in the $3 million category. 

Senator Cranston. Is that in current dollars ? 

General Jones. It is a little under $3 million in current fiscal year 
1976 budget dollars. It is a little over $3 million in the projected 
dollars for the future. 


Senator Hollings. I am going to move, Alan, on to something else 
and then come back to these, the F-16 and several others. 

I would like to get into this other area. 

General Jones, I agree with you about the topflight recruits, accept- 
ing 20 out of 100 that apply. I have a feeling, generally, that they learn 
to fly and get their flight pay and then quit flying, and the maintenance 
of these forces costs too much. 

I notice in your curriculum vitae you went in to the Air Force in 
April of 194*2. and you were flying by the next March, or you went 
in in March and were flying by the next April. Why is it in the training 
process of 20 years' service that you have 6 years of training and 


schooling and schooling and training? Isn't that a high percentage 
for any particular command or endeavor ? 

I would like to get in my years of service that much sabbatical 
time to go off and study. What is your comment on that? 

The required time for training to make a pilot, to begin with, isn't 
that unusually time costly ? 


General Jones. Yes, sir, it is costly. Of course, in that 6 years, I be- 
lieve you are probably including nonpilot training time. There is an 
educational period where we send people to the Squadron Officers 
School. We also send some to the Air War College, and to the Air Com- 
mand and St?ff College. I am just trying to calculate in my own 
career the various schools I attended. So many of these schools are not 
costly or anywhere near as costly as a flying training school, but we 
basically put a young man through pilot training, which takes about 
a year, and then he goes to a combat crew training school, and he is 
there for a few months, and then he goes out into an operational unit, 
and he will stay there for a number of years. 

Then as time goes on, he may go to that Squadron Officers School. 
After a few years, we will convert aircraft and go, for instance, from 
the F-105 to the F^, and we will send him to the F^ school to become 
combat-ready in the F-4 and then go back and be in his unit for a 
while, maybe into an operations job or a staff job. Later, he may 
attend Air Command and Staff College. 

So modernization to a great extent is one of the reasons he will go 
to more than one school in flying and learning to fly. We are cutting 
back on our pilots. Just a few years ago we were training 4.000 pilots 
a year. We will soon be under 1.500 per year new pilots. So this brings 
our training base down, brings the whole thing down very 

We do have today an excess of pilots ; not an excess of officers, but 
an excess of pilots. We have many pilots in jobs that normally would 
not require a pilot. 

number of officers drawing flight pay 

Senator Hollings. That means there is an excess of pilots on flight 
pay. I will include a copy of this table furnished by the Air Force. The 
number of officers in the Air Force is 102,873. The number of officers 
drawing flight pay — aviation career incentive pay — lieutenant colonel 
and below, is 29,014 pilots and 13,103 navigators for a total there of 

And then under colonels and generals, we have around 2,053 pilots, 
416 navigators, for a total of 2,469. 


In comparison with the 42,117 personnel with rank of lieutenant 
colonel and below — pilots and navigators — there are only 31,794 who 
arc actually flying. Of the 2,469 colonels and generals receiving flight 
pay there are only 667 actually flying. 

There are many other points in this table, and we will include the 
entire table in the record. 



SUBJECT: Air Force Rated Officers and Positions 

Mr. Hamilton, SBC, requested the following information/ 
12 Nov 1975: 

(Data as of 30 Sep 75) 

A. Number of officers in the Air Force 102,873 

B. Number of officers drawing Aviation Career Incentive 
Pay (ACIP) 

Lt Col and Below Cols and Generals 
Pilot 29,014 2,053 

Navigator 13,103 416 

*T0TAL 42,117 2,469 

* In addition 1 A 433 rated officers receive "save pay" 
IAW the ACIP Act of 1974--thru 31 May 1977 

C. Number of rated requirements (Lt Cols and Below) 

Pilot 24,690 

Navigator 12,356 

TOTAL 37,04 6 

D. Number of officers actually flying 

Lt Cols and Below C ols and Gens 
Pilot 22,291 663 

Navigator 9,503 4 

TOTAL 31,794 667 

65-705 O - 76 - 3 



General Jones. First. Mr. Chairman, we used to have a lot more 
proficiency flying when we had the support aircraft and training air- 
craft where we kept people flying their entire careers. We have now 
stopped people flying at certain years unless they are in a combat job. 
and there are other provisions. For example, there are very, very few 
people in the Pentagon who fly. 

During the period they are in the Pentagon for duty they don't fly 
with the exception of a very small number. Then when they go back 
to an operational unit, we will have a requalitication and they will fly 
at that time. 


Not very many of our generals are flying today except those that 
are in command of flying units. So there are some who are drawing 
flying pay under the save-pay provision which said, when Congress 
passed the legislation 18 months ago — that for 3 years, people who 
have been drawing flight pay may continue to draw, so they wouldn't 
immediately have a cut in pay. 


So there is a group of people in that category. But we are coming 
down. We soon will be under 100.000 officers from almost 103.000 now. 
We are coming down under 100,000 this year and we are coming down 
on our pilots, and as I mentioned, our inputs are down from 4,000 to 

So we are working off this extra number. Also the new bill that was 
passed by Congress about 18 months ago had what we called "gate 
provisions," which means that in order for people to continue to draw 
flying pay, they have to spend much more time in operational flying 
posit ions than in the past and we are now into that gate system. So we 
are moving in the right direction. 


Senator Hollings. Are you working off the right crowd? I ask that 
advisedly after our experience witli the Post Office Department. The 
civilian crowd took over and immediately fired anybody who knew 
anything about running the Post Office and you see the "result. 

They are still delivering Look magazine to my house. We find that 
you get those fine young men and train them and they become pilots 
and captains and make $16,000 or $17,000 a year. Then under the re- 
duction-in-force program the Air Force is forcing them out and keep- 
ing in all the colonels. 

A young captain stays around and the only thing he ever does as far 
as any incentive or thought or real dedication to the Air Force is find 
himself dedicated to old colonels waiting for their retirement. The 
young officers are not flying or moving or doing anything. They get dis- 
appointed and disillusioned, and they quit. 



Some of us feel the best way to succeed in the Air Force is to get out 
of the cockpit as soon as you can and get into the cross-training pro- 
gram. Go to as many schools as you can and stay out of the way and get 
under a colonel and stay quiet. What is your position on that? 


General Jones. In the last 2 years we have reduced our colonels by 
about 700 and we have provisions to continue to reduce our number 
of colonels. I believe we can. 


In manpower, the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act that 
is under consideration by the Armed Services Committee, there are 
provisions which will help solve this problem of people who get 
tenure and then are not subject to review under the current law. 
They can now be eliminated if they are totally inefficient, but if some- 
one starts coasting, the current system doesn't give us adequate pro- 
visions to separate such people. 


This new system will allow us to review periodically people who 
have tenure, to keep the incentive up. I am not saying that we have 
a large number of colonels in this category; we have done pretty 
well. But we would like to have this provision. 


What we are trying to do is to reach the proper balance where we 
don't have just all new people and we waste money on training these 
new people and where we don't have too many older people in the 
senior ranks: That is why we have cut the input to 1.500. But we 
don't want to go down below 1,500 because we need to maintain a 
training base and also to maintain some youth coming into the system. 


But we do have a basic pilot problem in the Air Force. About half 
today of what it was a year ago and we are working it off now pretty 
well. During the Vietnam war we increased the pilot production very 
substantially up to 4,000 and then all of a sudden things turned 
around and our force structure dropped and our number of pilot re- 
quirements dropped and we had this group on board. 


They are being used, because we are not over in officers. We are 
over in pilots, bur nor as much as last year. We are looking at the 
question of a KIF, reduction in force. We are not sure this year 
whether we will have to have a RIF. Our projections have been that 


we will need a RIF. But .we have been working the problem by en- 
couraging people to retire, and by other actions, to where now we are 
sitting where we are not sure we need a RIF, and the determination, to 
a great extent, will be based on our projections of the 1977 budget 
whenever that is made final. The young men that we have to RIF are 
very, very competent. I have talked with some of them and I have 
looked at their records. We would rather not have to RIF our officers 
and would rather work our problem out in the longer term than have 
an immediate, drastic impact on some very capable young people. 


Senator Chiles. On those pilots that you are indicating as excess, 
do most of them go on and get their flight pay? Do you keep them 
qualified that way or do you feel like there are certain of those that 
if they are not going to be in a pilot slot, you therefore don't have to 
give them the flight pay or have them get the flight pay ? 


General Jones. There is a mix. There are some that under the law 
get the save-pay provision for another 16 months who are not flying, 
but they get the flying pay. Flying pay is nowhere near what it was 
when I was a young officer. 

When I was a young officer, it was half my basic pay. Today it runs 
$150, $160 up to $240, something in that category. 


Senator Chiles. Depending on your rank ? 

General Jones. And it goes down as you get more senior as opposed 
to other pay which normally goes up for senior people, I think it is 
$150 or $160, and something like $245 for a more junior person. 


So it is not the percentage it used to be. In one air force they said 
their flight pay is about 100 percent of their base pay, so ours is a small 

There are some young pilots coming in the system that we have fly- 
ing temporarily on a C-5 — we will have three pilots where normally 
you will only need two. It is good for a young lieutenant to get that 
experience though there are three people aboard and you have to 
rotate in flying that multimillion-dollar aircraft. I don't mean to over- 
state our pilot situation. It is not a great problem now. 

We have worked our way at least halfway out of it, and we will 
work out of it in the days ahead unless there is a significant change 
in requirements. 


Senator Chiles. But you do have pilots that are not getting flight 
pay in the lower ranks, or do you ? 

General Jones. The flying pay is very complicated these days with 
these gates, and we support the gate concept. I forget the specific 


numbers, but if you fly something like 6 out of the first 12 years, you 
get pay for a certain length of time. If you fly more, you get paid 
depending on a longer look at your career rather than just a 1-year 

So if you have been doing lots of flying and you go to school, you can 
continue to get pay. If you haven't been doing much flying and you go 
to school, you don't get paid. 

That is an oversimplification of a very complicated schedule. 


Senator Chiles. So it is not based on how many hours and months 
that you fly ? 

General Jones. It is, during that time that you are involved. We used 
to get pay only for the months in which we flew, and every year we 
would have to fly in order to get that pay. As a result we had at our 
professional schools lots of aircraft out on the flight line at great 
expense — far, far more than the flying pay — in order for those people 
to fly to maintain their proficiency, to get their flying pay. 

Congress many years ago said, don't spend the money on those sup- 
port airplanes, we will pay during that schooling period without fly- 
ing. Then the bill about 18 months ago said, we will do it, but only if 
you have done a lot of flying previously and have been in the cockpit 
for a long time — then when you go, you get flying pay. 

That was worked out by the Congress about 18 months ago, and 
it is a good balance. It makes us manage better, and it makes us keep 
our people in the cockpits a little bit more. It is a trend in the right 


Senator Hollings. What is the cost of training a pilot, General 
Jones, about a half million bucks ? 

I had a note somewhere that said it was about $300,000 to $500,000. 

General Jones. That is the total for an individual into a combat 
airplane. That is not to make him a basic pilot. That is to train him into 
an aircraft. 


Senator Hollings. Senator Nunn was commenting on the cost of 
pilot training, and he listed at that time $157,000 as an average cost for 
undergraduate training, and then for an F—t pilot. $267,400 for pilot 
training costs. So it is getting up there, isn't that right ? 

General Jones. Yes, sir. It costs $162,900 to make him a pilot. From 
there on in he can go into a number of aircraft, some fairly low-cost 
training, some fairly high cost, and the $267,400 puts him in an opera- 
tional airplane and makes him a combat-ready pilot. But a pilot al- 
ready wearing wings can also fly these airplanes. 

You can put him in an F-15 or a B-52 and make him combat-ready. 
The second figure is an average for such training. 


Senator Hollings. And the average stay of a pilot in the Air Force 
is about 10.8 years, is that right? 


General Jones. Yes, sir. But that is an average; it is not the statis- 
tical mode in that most of .our people will either stay about 5 years or 
20 years or more. There are a few that go out in the middle, but it is 
usually either 5 or 20. It tends to be an uneven distribution: 20 for 
retirement, 5 for minimum commitment. 


Senator Hollings. Let's go for a moment then to the high main- 
tenance costs. The Air Force complains annually of a high maintenace 
backlog. They talk and testify about large numbers of aircraft tied up 
due to a lack of maintenance funds. From my notes I find that the Air 
Force allocates about 58 to 60 maintenance man-hours for a B-52, 
about 44 for a C-5, 30 to 34 for the F-4, 25 for the F-T and F-15, 20 
to 21 for the C-141 and C-130. 

Now, the commercial airlines. General Jones, tell me they have 
succeeded in greatly reducing maintenance man-hours by a variety of 
modern management techniques. The major airlines tell us that they 
devote 1 to 2 direct maintenance man-hours per flying hour to a DO-7 
or a Boeing-727. and with the wide body jets, the DC-10, about double 
that — or to 4 direct maintenance man-hours per flying hour. 

Are those figures accurate? Has the Air Force been concerned about 
this ; and if so, what are you folks doing about it ? 


General Jones. I am an old maintenance type. I spent 2 years as the 
chief of maintenance of a B-52 outfit, and we have many, many 
changes that have been made and are being made in the way we do 
maintenance. But there is a little bit of apples and oranges there. 

One is the airlines fly very high utilization rates. They fly some of 
the 747's and DC-10's'l2 hours a day. Our aircraft will fly maybe 1 
hour a day. On some days we might fly more, but I am talking about 
a fighter aircraft that may fly 1 hour a day. 


You have certain maintenance requirements even if you don't fly, or 
if you fly 1 hour a day that are the same whether you fly 1 hour or 12 
hours in a day. So there is an awful lot of apples and oranges. 

Also within this there are hours for munitions maintenance and 
other categories which are a siirnificant part. We work very closely 
with the airlines. We are adopting some of their concepts, and in the 
past they adopted some of our concepts. "We think we maintain our 
aircraft fairly well. 


We are working to maintain them better. We have some ideas in 
this regard. But the airlines also have the advantage of their people 
being 12. 1 \; 15 years in the business of maintaining airplanes, whereas 
we will have a young man or woman who is counted in the mainte- 
nance hours who has been out of tech school maybe a month or 2 
months or a year. So the experience level is a great deal different. But 
there are many, many factors to make it different. 


TTe work with the airlines, and we are not that much different in 
how we do our business. 


Senator Hollings. Those wide comparisons are not appropriate 
then? For example, the difference between 2 and 4 hours and 58 to 60 
maintenance man-hours for a B-52 ? 

General Jones. I think they are misleading in that I could im- 
mediately reduce the maintenance man-hours per flying hour in the 
B-52 by flying longer and more missions. 

Senator Hollings. Right, I understand that. 


General Jones. That would immediately probably cut it in half. 
However, we have tended, at times, to overmaintain our airplanes and 
inspect them more often than necessary. 

There is another factor that tends to be misleading in this also. It 
is that to a great extent we man for a wartime surge rate so we can 
fight in time of war at high utilization rates 24 hours a day. 7 days a 
week. So in peacetime you have that wartime manning capability 
which you use to maintain airplanes, but which you would not always 
need in peacetime if you were always going to stay at that low flying 


Senator Hollings. General Jones, what productivity measures are 
being implemented in maintenance and for what percentage of the 
Air Force's work force ? In other words, can you give the committee 
a general rundown of the efforts being made "to measure the produc- 
tivity of the military and civilian manpower, the supply and the other 
support activities, and what productivity measures are being imple- 
mented ? 

General Jones. Yes. sir. TVe have what we call our management 
engineering teams that go out and actually measure work and measure 
requirements of people to perform that work, and we have a very high 
percentage, I think it is the highest of any of the services — of our 
people under this management evaluation effort, to determine what is 


TVe are increasing the number all the time as to people who are 
under it. So we can measure our productivity quite well. One of the 
initiatives we are taking in reducing the requirements is what we call 
Queen Bee. That is, rather than do all the work at each base, we will 
do the more major work at central locations. 

Take a B-52. We are running a test now where more of the major 
maintenance is done at one base with less maintenance distributed 
out through the system. By consolidating we can get by with less 
equipment and fewer people. So that is one concept. 



We are testing another Concept in both Florida and in Arizona since 
we are getting greater stability in the Air Force and our people, we 
can have individuals trained in a broader career field so that maybe 
one person can do the work of two because he is around -long enough 
to be trained to work on more than one group of black boxes. If we 
have tremendous turnover we can train an individual to work in just 
one specialty. 

We think we can expand it a great deal. We can make good progress 
in maintenance. We have a lot of interesting tests going on. 


Senator Hollings. I have a note on bases. Be careful because you are 
liable to close some in my backyard. 

What bases, if any, could you recommend as surplus to the Air Force 
now? Is every one of them absolutely necessary to the Air Force or 
could you close some of them and promote efficiency and economy at 
the same time? 

General Jones. We have closed many bases in the years past. I would 
expect that in the next couple of years we would close some more bases. 
Right now we are analyzing for the 1977 budget our total force struc- 
ture and our overseas alinements — the change in Thailand — that has 
an impact on the number of bases we own. 


So our number of bases has been coming down very substantially 
and I would expect that to continue. We ought to recognize that the 
first year you close a base it costs money. There are the entitlements. 
You have not only the cost of moving people, but the entitlements of 
the people we let go. 

So normally the first year it costs money to close a base and you start 
your savings in the second year. 

Senator Hollings. Like Donaldson at Greenville, S.C., we put 13 
industries in there and it has worked out very well. 


With respect to the intelligence budget, General Jones, Senator 
Cranston has been interested in this and I was waiting for him to come 
back. Do you have a high amount of unnecessary intelligence costs 
within the Air Force budget, or would you like to rid yourself of 
certain intelligence budgeting that really doesn't pertain directly to 
the Air Force '. 


General Jones. Senator, if I could take that mission out and still 
keep the total money, it would be nice. But the money goes with the 

Senator Hollings. Air Force missions ? 


General Jones. No. What I mean is if somebody took a certain mis- 
sion out of my budget, then my budgel would be reduced by the amount 
of money earmarked for that mission. Therefore, T personally have no 
objections to funding some national programs out of the Air Force 
budget because nobody says you can have $26 billion and then you 
must do this. 

It builds from the bottom up rather than from the top down. So 
it really doesn't give me any concern that I fund national programs. 


Senator Hollings. On the 5-year projection of your budget, can 
you give the committee the projected budget for the mission and the 
projected budget for the Air Force for the next 5-years? 

General Jones. In general terms, our object would be to level off and 
have, hopefully, a real growth in the long term of about 1 to 2 percent. 


Senator Hollings. What is the specific requirement for four addi- 
tional tactical air squadrons and what will they cost ? 

A- 10 AND F-1G 

General Jones. We are not really adding the additional units. What 
we have had is 26 wings of — if you went out and counted our wings 
today, we have 26 wings formed, but we have only had 22 wings worth 
of airplanes. So what we are trying to do with the high-low mix in 
cost is go for cheaper airplanes, less expensive A-10 and F-16, rather 
than fewer higher cost aircraft and stay at the undermanned or under- 
equipped level. 

It is basically to round out to the 26 wings we already have and 
round them out with less expensive airplanes such as the A-10 and 
the F-16 rather than having a smaller number of more expensive air- 
planes. We will do this within the budget projections I was talking 
about. We will do it within the manpower that we are authorized, 
which means taking people out of support and putting them into 
combat capability and better utilization of our maintenance people 
who are already performing maintenance on aircraft. 


Senator Hollixgs. We would appreciate your furnishing for the 
record the 5-year projected budget for the Air Force allocated in 
terms of operating costs and investment costs. Maybe I could ask now 
what would you do if you had a 5-percent cut and what would you do 
if you had a 5-percent increase \ 


General Jones. Mr. Chairman, a cut in the earlier years would 
tend to have a disproportionate impact because, to a great ex- 
tent, we are in a bind of controllability with our funds because of 

65-705 O - 76 - 


entitlements and incurred costs. Therefore, for early cuts we tend to 
end ii]) with, Xo. 1 cutting. flying hours and fuel, which has a dispro- 
portionate impact on combat readiness — beyond the 5 percent — and 
personnel. But the only way you really save money on personnel in the 
near term is to reduce the input, because when you put someone out 
who is already in. such as rimng an officer, they get entitlements you 
have to pay out. and it really starts to cost you money, usually, in the 
first year. 

So the cuts in the near term tend to have, because of this controllabil- 
ity and entitlement, a disproportionate impact on readiness. It is hard 
to cut 5 percent in dollars and not have a significantly higher impact 
on readiness, reduction of flying combat readiness hours, training of 
our people, our crews. 

As for the increase, Ave would balance it with some in research and 


One of the reasons we have been able to maintain a strategic balance 
and an overall balance with the Soviet Union is because of oualitv and 
good E. & D. I am concerned about the erosion of our effort in re- 
search and development, so I would nut some in research and develop- 
ment. I would insure that we would continue to modernize with our 
new svstems: the B-l ; and particularly the AWACS, on which we 
put Xo. 1 priority in the general purpose area ; and also buy some 
additional spares for wartime use for our combat force. I would tend 
to spread it out a little bit in all three of these categories. 

[The information follows:] 

[In millions of dollars] 















17, 206 
16, 390 

16. 494 

18, 624 
16, 528 

Notes: (1) The above figures represent the estimates included in the President's fiscal year 1976-7T budget request. 
(2) Investment costs include funds for R.D.T. & E., aircraft and missile procurement, other procurement, and military 
construction appropriations and provide for future escalation. Operating costs include funds for military personnel and 
operation and maintenance appropriations. These operating appropriations are priced at current pay rates and price 


Senator Hollixos. What were the projected program unit costs 
of the F-16 and what are they now? 

General Jones. T do not. recall the specific number. It was $4.5 
million, I believe, but I am not sure on that. 


Senator Holungs. There have been some major changes in the 
design and cost increases, is that not correct? 

General Jones. Well, years ago people talked about a lightweight 
fighter. They established certain numbers and then we developed an 
airplane that is different than what the people were considering as 


that lightweight fighter. So if you take it back to that number, it is 
different. But the F-16 program, since its inception and since we have 
started working on it, has been very, very well controlled in costs. 

Other than inflation, we are doing very, very well and our negoti- 
ations with the contractor and cost estimates are within the budget 


Senator Hollings. The change in the fuselage size and the aero- 
dynamic design did not materially increase costs? 

General Jones. Not in comparison with weapons systems of the 
past. We just lengthened the fuselage about 20 inches so we can get 
the second pilot in the training airplane and we put a little more in the 
wing area. But for the airplane, our cost projections now are very good 
on the F-16. Our two radars are flying in competition now in F-4 
aircraft as a testbed. It looks like they may come in under our cost 

The program right now is doing very well as far as our management 
is concerned. I predict that we will be able to control costs, adjusted 
for inflation, obviously. But I think it would be one of our better 
managed programs. 


Senator Hollings. That includes, of course, the change for the new 
radar. I think that required lengthening the fuselage 

General Jones. No, sir, not for the radar. In the variant they were 
looking at for the Navy, it would have had a bigger nose and a bigger 
area for radar but not for ours. 

Senator Hollings. Is the cost of radar included in the plane and 
your comments with respect to staying in the ball park ? 

General Jones. Yes, sir, that is total flyaway costs. 


Senator Hollings. General Jones, what proportion of our tactical 
Air Force is devoted to the mission of air superiority and what pro- 
portion to close support and then to deep interdiction? 


General Jones. Mr. Chairman, we do not break it out that way. I 
categorize it a little differently. We have our F-lll's that are called 
deep interdiction airplanes by most people. We do not plan to use 
them for deep interdiction. It is the best all-weather tactical air- 
plane we have. As a former commander of the 4th Allied Tactical 
Air Force in Europe, not only the U.S. Air Force but of our allies. I 
considered it to be the No. 1 plane we would use to blast a break- 
through at night and in bad weather. 

We are extensively using it in radar beacon offset -bombing and in 
other modes of employment near the front line. I do not say that under 
certain conditions we would not use it deeper behind the lines but 
primarily it would be used nights and/or all-weather in the forward 
areas in battlefield interdiction — not really close air support of a sol- 
dier in a foxhole but in the forward battle area. 


F— 4, AND F-15 

The A-7 would be used in the forward area. The F-4 we consider 
to be a swing force — air-to-air and air-to-ground. The F-15 will be 
primarily air-to-air. There may be some documents that talk about 
air doctrines as to air superiority, interdiction and all of that, but we 
should recognize that as used in Europe, we operate as part of Allied 
Air Forces under Allied control with a U.S. commander. The plan is 
to use the air in Europe to stop a breakthrough with very, very limited 
operations deep in enemy territory or deep strikes for air superiority 
against his airfields. 

I am not saving there will not be some of that. But, basically most of 
our air would be committed to battlefield support and battlefield air 


Senator Hollings. With respect to your answer. General Jones, 
on the matter of wings, as I understood it you said we had 26 wings 
and we were fleshing out 4. The Department of Defense in its report 
talks of the active tactical fighter force being retained at 22 wings. 
They have really always talked in terms of 22 wings in all the docu- 
ments we know of. I am trying to get it clear in my mind. 

I sometimes get the feeling that some of us do that, perhaps you are 
adding four wings and if so, why do you need these new aircraft. 


General Jones. The 22 wings calculation is a matter of arithmetic. 
Normally a wing would have 72 aircraft and if you take our aircraft 
assigned to units and divide by 72 you would come out a little over 22. 


But when you go out and look at the number of tactical fighter 
wings we have that are manned with a wing commander and squadrons 
and the organization, we have 26 tactical fighter wings. So what we 
are saying is that we would fill out those 26 wings. So it depends on 
how you calculate it. 


If you add the airplanes up and divide by 72 you come out with 22. 
With the growing modernization of the Soviet Air Force — and it is 
as dramatic in my mind as the growth in their sea capability, their 
maritime capability- — -a growth not only in numbers but in quality 
with many new aircraft the Soviets have been tinning out, our options 
were to go for smaller numbers including more expensive airplanes 
or larger numbers with a mix of inexpensive airplanes, inexpensive 
not only in acquisition but in operating costs. So that is what we are 
talking about with the 2(5 wing force, but we will do it within our cur- 
rent manpower, within our current management structure, within those 
current 26 wings that are already formed. 1 guess the point is we are 
not going out and activating four new wings with new wing com- 
manders and all the base structure and all that goes with it which is 
a costly part of it. 



Senator Hollings. Will you elaborate on that growth in Soviet air- 
power, as you can. for the committee? You say it is as dramatic as 
their growth in seapower? 


General Jones. Yes, sir. Until a few years ago the Soviets' Air Force 
was generally limited to air interceptors, clear weather, fairly short 
range. There were thousands of earlier versions of the MIG's, with 
some limited capability in ground attack. Xow with the Foxbat and the 
Flogger, the later Mig's, they have a far greater range, greater pay- 
load, greater radar capability. They have sheltered most of their air- 
craft in Eastern Europe so that they are not as vulnerable on the 
ground. They have expanded their command control capability and 
hardened it very substantially, and they have increased their numbers 


But the most dramatic change was in the quality of the new aircraft 
introduced, particularly into the forward area. Having just returned 
a year ago last summer from Europe, I could see the very marked in- 
crease in capability of the Warsaw Pact but primarily the Soviet Air 

They were introducing the new systems into the forward area with 
longer range, better payloads, greater offensive capability, greater 
countermeasures — a significant advance. 


Senator Hollings. What impact on the Soviet strategic force de- 
ployment and modernization is expected to result from the Vladivos- 
tok Accords. What are the results and implications for Your planning 
of the U.S. Air Force? 


General Jones. I fully support that action of the President and of the 
•2.400 ceiling — and hopefully subsequent negotiations will result in a 
lesser number — it is essential that the United States maintain a proper 
balance. As long as the number is 2,400 — agreed to on both sides, and 
undoubtedly the Soviets will have the 2.400— we in the United States 
should not be appreciably short of that 2,400. 

We should have an objective to be at the 2,400 or very, very close to it. 
Any significant number less than that automatically accrues to them a 
perceived advantage. 


Our intent would be to modernize the bomber force with the B-l. to 
continue work on an improved missile for the Minuteman, the MX. 
The pressure, though, on the third leg of the triad, the land-based bal- 


listic missile, is less if we modernize the second leg of the triad, the 
bomber force. 

T f you do not modernize the bomber force, there is a greater urgency 
to do things with the missile force. It is interrelated. So we would con- 
tinue to modernize with the B-l and continue some work on the M-X 
type missile to replace the Minuteman — not at a high rate of expendi- 
ture, but enough to keep the technology going. More work on mobility 
possibilities, air and land mobile missiles. 

Senator Hollixgs. Will the mobil ICBM's offer an appropriate 
hedge against fixed-sight vulnerability ? 

General Jones! Yes. sir. they would. The need though, would de- 
pend on how well the other two legs of the triad were doing in effec- 
tiveness and survivability. 


Senator Hollixgs. How will the improved accuracy and increasing 
numbers of Soviet warheads affect the survivability of land-based 

General Jones. The most critical thing, of course, is accuracy and as 
Soviet missiles become more accurate the probability of their being 
able to destroy some of the Minuteman goes up. I think it will be a 
long time before they could disarm the Minuteman force with any 
great assurance. I question whether they will ever be able to achieve 
that, but obviously as they get greater accuracy, the vulnerability of 
an individual missile goes up. It is very interrelated. The important 
point is how well we modernize the rest of the strategic force. 

The criticality of ICBM vulnerability depends on how we modernize 
the rest. 


Senator Hollixgs. What will be the effect of the development and 
deployment of the strategic cruise missiles by either the United States 
or the Soviets on the strategic balance? 

Genera] Jones. The impact would depend on the numbers and the 
conditions under which they were deployed. If the United States de- 
ployed its cruise missiles, it would be in an attempt to maintain the 
balance and to offset some of the advantage the Soviets now have in 
numbers of missiles. So, we would not be trying to upset a balance, but 
to maintain a balance. 


Senator Homjngs. Is the B-l program proceeding fast enough. Gen- 
eral Jones, in your opinion '. 

General Jones. Our concern is twofold. One is when it will come into 
the operal ional fleet in the early 1980's, and the other one is to be able 
to manage the program in an efficient way. 

When we get these so-called bathtubs where we do not get ade- 
quate financing, and we have to stretch the program out. we lose the 
continuity of the operation which increases program costs greatly. 


That is why we are concerned about the small amount of long-lead time 
money, small in comparison with total program costs in this year's 


It is not that we want a commitment this year to production with the 
64 million fiscal 1976 dollars; it is to keep from having a loss of con- 
tinuity resulting in increased costs of hundreds of millions of dollars 
from disrupting the program. There are two reasons we would like to 
proceed at a good orderly rate, and one is the need for the aircraft 
from a strategic standpoint, and we are concerned because it has been 
slipping due to lack of funds. Second, we want to be able to manage the 
program efficiently. 


Senator Hollings. It has been slipping to what extent ? If you were 
in charge of the entire program, not only commanding it but eongres- 
sionally appropriating for it, how would you accelerate it? What 
amounts do you need to have to proceed in accordance with what you 
deem necessary? 

General Jones. I would not propose that we would put massive 
amounts of money into trying to go to a fairly high risk program. 
I would put a little more in than is probably going to come out of 
Congress, and I would structure a well-managed program and fund 
it to that level, as opposed to having these stretchouts and peaks and 
valleys. I will try to get an operational capability within the early 


Senator Hollings. You mentioned the sheltered nature of the 
Soviets' aircraft in Europe. What percentage of the United States or 
NATO aircraft are sheltered in Europe? 

! General Jones. Seventy percent is the number that has been estab- 
lished by SHAPE that they would fund for sheltering. 

All nations are not up yet to the 70 percent, and we do not have our 
augmentation forces or our airplanes in the United Kingdom sheltered 
yet. So we are down below the 50-percent mark. 


Senator Hollings. With respect to maintenance. General Jones, are 
you familiar with a document by the Air Transport Association pre- 
pared by the Reliability and Maintainability Subcommittee, the air- 
line/manufacturer maintenance program planning document? 

Genera] Jones. No, sir. 

Senator Hollings. Will you hand this to the General so he can see 
what I am asking about ? I might want to make that part of the record 
and then have you examine it and for the record later on submit your 






Prepared By: R 6 M Subcommittee 

Air Transport Association 

Date: March 25, 1970 

Air Transport Association of America 
1709 New York Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D. C. 20006 



1.1 Introduction 

Airline and manufacturer experience in developing scheduled 
maintenance programs for new aircraft has shown that more 
efficient programs can be developed through the use of logical 
decision processes. In July, 1968 representatives of various 
airlines developed Handbook #MSG-1, "Maintenance Evaluation 
and Program Development" , which included decision logic and 
interairline/manufacturer procedures for developing a maintenance 
program for the new Boeing 747 airplane. Subsequently, it was 
decided that experience gained on this project should be applied 
to update the decision logic and to delete certain 747 detail 
procedural information so that a universal document could be 
made applicable for later new type aircraft. This has been done 
and has resulted in this document, #MSG-2. 

1.2 Objective 

It is the objective of this document to present a means for de- 
veloping a maintenance program which will be acceptable to the 
Regulatory Authorities, the Operators, and the Manufacturers. 
The maintenance program data will be developed by coordination 
with specialists from the operators, manufacturers and when 
feasible, the regulatory authority of the country of manufacture. 
Specifically it is the objective of this document to outline the 
general organization and decision processes for determining the 
essential scheduled maintenance requirements for new airplanes. 

Historically, the initial scheduled maintenance program has been specified 
in Maintenance Review Board Documents. This document is intended 
to facilitate the development of initial scheduled maintenance 
programs. The remaining maintenance, that is non-scheduled or 
non-routine maintenance, is directed by the findings of the sched- 
uled maintenance program and the normal operation of the aircraft. 
The remaining maintenance consists of maintenance actions to cor- 
rect discrepancies noted during scheduled maintenance tasks, non- 
scheduled maintenance, normal operation, or condition monitoring. 

1.3 Scope 

The scope of this document shall encompass the maintenance program 
for the entire airplane. 

1.4 Organization 

The organization to carry out the maintenance program development 
pertinent to a specific type aircraft shall be staffed by repre- 
sentatives of the Airline Operators purchasing the equipment, the 
Prime Manufacturers of the airframe and powerplant and when feasible 
the Regulatory Authority. 


1.4 (Continued) 

1.4.1 The management of the maintenance program development 
activities shall be accomplished by a Steering Group 
composed of members from a representative number of 
Operators and a representative of the Prime Airframe and 
Engine Manufacturers. It shall be the responsibility of 
this group to establish policy, direct the activities of 
Working Groups or other working activity, carry out liai- 
son with the manufacturer and other operators, prepare 
the final program recommendations and represent the op- 
erators in contacts with the Regulatory Authority. 

1.4.2 A number of Working Groups, consisting of specialist rep- 
resentatives from the participating Operators, the Prime 
Manufacturer, and when feasible the Regulatory Authority, 
may be constituted. The Steering Group, alternatively, 
may arrange some other means for obtaining the detailed 
technical information necessary to develop recommendations 
for maintenance programs in each area. Irrespective of 
the organization of the working activity, it must provide 
written technical data that support its recommendations to 
the Steering Group. After approval by the Steering Group 
these analyses and recommendations shall be consolidated 
into a final report for presentation to the Regulatory 


2.1 Program Requirement 

It is necessary to develop a maintenance program for each new type 
of airplane prior to its introduction into airline service. 

2.1.1 The primary purpose of this document is to develop a pro- 
posal to assist the Regulatory Authority to establish an 
initial maintenance program for new types of airplanes. 
The purpose of this program is to maintain the inherent 
design levels of operating safety.* This program becomes 
the basis for the first issue of each airline's Operations 
Specifications-Maintenance to govern its initial maintenance 
policy. These are subject, upon application by individual 
airlines, to revisions which may be unique to those air- 
lines as operating experience is accumulated. 

2.1.2 It is desirable, therefore, to define in some detail: 

(a) The objectives of an efficient maintenance program, 

(b) The content of an efficient maintenance program, and 

(c) The process by which an efficient maintenance program 
can be developed. 

* See Glossary 

- 2 - 


2.1 (Continued) 

2.1.3 The Objectives of an efficient airline maintenance program 

(a) To prevent deterioration of the inherent design 
levels of reliability and operating safety of 
the aircraft, and 

(b) To accomplish this protection at the minimum 
practical costs. 

2.1.4 These objectives recognize that maintenance programs, as 
such, cannot correct deficiencies in the inherent design 
levels of flight equipment reliability. The maintenance 
program can only prevent deterioration of such inherent 
levels. If the inherent levels are found to be unsatis- 
factory, engineering action is necessary to obtain improve- 

2.1.5 The maintenance program itself consists of two types of 

(a) A group of scheduled tasks to be accomplished at 
specified intervals. The objective of these tasks 
is to prevent deterioration of the inherent design 
levels of aircraft reliability, and 

(b) A group of non-scheduled tasks which results from: 

(i) The scheduled tasks accomplished at 
specified intervals, 

(ii) Reports of malfunctions (usually originated 
by the flight crew), or 

(iii) Condition Monitoring. 

The objective of these non-scheduled tasks is to restore 
the equipment to its inherent level of reliability. This document describes procedures for developing 
the scheduled maintenance program. Non-scheduled 
maintenance results from scheduled tasks , normal 
operation or condition monitoring. 

2.1.6 Maintenance programs generally include one or more of the 
following primary maintenance processes: 

Hard Time Limit: A maximum interval for performing 

maintenance tasks. These intervals 
usually apply to overhaul , but also apply to 
total life of parts or units. 


2.1 (Continued) 

On Condition: Repetitive inspections, or tests to 
determine the condition of units or 
systems or portions of structure. (Ref.: 
FAA Advisory Circular 121-1). 

Condition Monitoring: For items that have neither hard time 
limits nor on condition maintenance 
as their primary maintenance process. Condition mon- 
itoring is accomplished by appropriate means available 
to an operator for finding and resolving problem 
areas. These means range from notices of un- 
usual problems to special analysis of unit 
performance. No specific monitoring system 
is implied for any given unit. (Ref.: FAA 
Procedures 8310.4, paragraph 3033). 

This document results in scheduled tasks that fit the 
hard time limit or on condition maintenance programs 
or, where no tasks are specified, the item is included 
in condition monitoring. 

2.2 Scheduled Maintenance Program Content 

The tasks in a scheduled maintenance program may include: 

(a) Servicing 

(b) Inspection 

(c) Testing 

(d) Calibration 

(e) Replacement 

2.2.1 An efficient program is one which schedules only those 
tasks necessary to meet the stated objectives. It does 
not schedule additional tasks which will increase main- 
tenance costs without a corresponding increase in relia- 
bility protection. 

2.2.2 The development of a scheduled maintenance program re- 
quires a very large number of decisions pertaining to: 

(a) Which individual tasks are necessary, 

(b) How frequently these tasks should be scheduled, 

(c) What facilities are required to enable these 
tasks to be accomplished, 


2.2 (Continued) 

(d) Where these facilities should be located, and 

(e) Which tasks should be accomplished concurrently 
in the interests of economy. 

2.3 Aircraft System/Component Analysis Method 

The method for determining the content of the scheduled maintenance 
program for systems and components (parts a and b of Paragraph 
2.2.2) uses decision diagrams. These diagrams are the basis of 
an evaluatory process applied to each system and its significant 
items using technical data provided (Ref. 2.7). Principally, the 
evaluations are based on the systems' and items' functions and 
failure modes . The purpose is to: 

a) Identify the systems and their significant items*. 

b) Identify their functions*, failure modes* and failure 

c) Define scheduled maintenance tasks having potential 
effectiveness* relative to the control of operational 

d) Assess the desirability of scheduling those tasks having 
potential effectiveness. 

2.3.1 It should be noted that there is a difference between 
"potential" effectiveness of a task versus the "desir- 
ability" of including this task in the scheduled main- 
tenance program. The approach taken in the following 
procedure is to plot a path whereby a final judgment can 
be made as to whether those potentially effective tasks 
are worthy of inclusion in an initial maintenance program 
for a new airplane. 

2.3.2 There are 3 decision diagrams provided (Appendix I, Figures 
1 thru 3). Figure 1 is used to determine scheduled main- 
tenance tasks having potential effectiveness relative to 
the control of operational reliability. This determines 
tasks which can be done. 

Figures 2 and 3 are used to assess the desirability of 
scheduling those tasks having potential effectiveness. 

Figure 2 tasks must be done to prevent direct adverse 
effects on operating safety and to assure availability 
of hidden functions. 

Figure 3 tasks should be done for economic value. 

See Glossary. 


2.3 (Continued) 


The total analysis process is shown diagramatically 
below. See Appendix I for details. 

These tasks have 
potential effec- 
tiveness 6 can 
be done. 

These tasks must 
be done to prevent 
direct adverse 
effects on oper- 
ating safety & assure 
availability of hidden 

These tasks should 
be done for economic 

The following guidelines encourage consideration of failure 
consequences and the potential effectiveness of scheduled 
maintenance tasks. In those cases where failure conse- 
quences are purely economic, the guidelines lead to con- 
sideration of both the cost of the scheduled maintenance 
and the value of the benefits which will result from the 


2.3 (Continued) 

2.3.5 A decision tree diagram (Figure 1 of Appendix 1) facilitates 
the definition of scheduled maintenance tasks having poten- 
tial effectiveness. There are five key questions. 

Note: Questions (a), (b), 6 (c) must be answered for each 
failure mode, question (d) for each function, and 
question (e) for the item as a whole. 

(a) Is reduction in failure resistance* detectable by 
routine flight crew monitoring*? 

(b) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by 
in situ maintenance or unit test? 

(c) Does failure mode have a direct adverse effect 
upon operating safety? (See Appendix 2) 

(d) Is the function hidden from the viewpoint of the 
flight crew? (See Appendix 3) 

(e) Is there an adverse relationship between age and 

2.3.6 Each question should be answered in isolation, e.g. in 
question (c) all tasks which prevent direct adverse ef- 
fects on operating safety must be listed. This may re- 
sult in the same task being listed for more than one 

2.3.7 If the answer to question (a) is Yes, this means there 
are methods available through monitoring of the normal 
in-flight instrumentation to detect incipient conditions 
before undesirable system effects occur. A Yes answer 
does not require a maintenance task. If the answer is 
No, there is no in-flight monitoring which can detect 

! reduction in failure resistance. This question is meant 

to refer to the flight crews' ability to detect deterio- 
rating calibration or system operation before a failure 
occurs. NOTE: Tasks resulting from in-flight monitoring 
are part of non-scheduled maintenance. 

2.3.8 If the answer to question (b) is Yes, it means there is a 
maintenance task, not requiring item disassembly, that has 
potential effectiveness in detecting incipient conditions* 
before undesirable system effects occur. Tasks may include 
inspection, servicing, testing, etc. NOTE: Tasks result- 
ing from a Yes answer to question (b) are part of the On 
Condition maintenance program. 

See Glossary. 


2.3 (Continued) 

2.3.9 If the answer to question (c) is Yes, this failure mode 
has a direct, adverse effect on operating safety. It 
is necessary to examine the mechanism of failure and 
identify the single cells or simple assemblies where 

the failure initiates. Specific total time, total flight 
cycle, time since overhaul or cycle since overhaul limi- 
tations may be assigned these single cells or simple 
assemblies and the probability of operational failures 
will be minimized. Examples of these actions are turbine 
engine disc limits, airplane flap link life limits, etc. 
In many cases, these limits must be based upon manufac- 
turer's development testing. Fortunately, there is only 
a small number of failure modes which have a direct, 
adverse effect on operating safety. This results from 
the fact that failure mode analyses are conducted through- 
out the process of flight equipment design. In most cases, 
it is possible after identification of such a failure mode 
to make design changes (redundancy, incorporation of pro- 
tective devices, etc.) which eliminate its direct adverse 
effect upon operating safety. If no potentially effective 
task exists, then the deficiency in design must be referred 
back to the manufacturer. The term "direct adverse effect 
upon operating safety" is explained in Appendix 2. NOTE: 
Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (c) are part of 
either the Hard Time limitation maintenance program, or the On 
Condition maintenance program. 

2.3.10 Refer to Appendix 3 for explanation of question (d). If 
the answer to question (d) is Yes, periodic ground test 
or shop tests may be required if there is no other way of 
ensuring that there is a high probability of the hidden 
function being available when required. The frequencies 
of these tests are associated with failure consequences 
and anticipated failure probability. A component cannot 
be considered to have a hidden function if failure of 
that function results in a system malfunction which is 
evident to the flight crew during normal operations. In 
this case, the answer must be No. NOTE: Tasks resulting 
from a Yes answer to question (d) may be part of either 
the Hard Time limitation or the On Condition maintenance 

2.3.11 If the answer to question (e) is Yes, periodic overhaul 
may be an effective way of controlling reliability. 
Whether or not a fixed overhaul time limit will indeed 

be effective can be determined only by actuarial analysis 
of operating experience. NOTE: Tasks resulting from a 
Yes answer to question (e) are part of the Hard Time 
limitation maintenance program. 


2.3 (Continued) 

2.3.12 It has been found that overall measures of reliability of 
complex components, such as the premature removal rate, 
usually are not functions of the age of these components. 
In most cases, therefore, the answer to question (e) is 
No. In this event, scheduled overhaul cannot improve op- 
erating reliability. Engineering action is the only means 
of improving reliability. These components should be op- 
erated, therefore, without scheduled overhaul. NOTE: 
Systems or items which require no scheduled tasks are in- 
cluded in Condition Monitoring. 

2.3.13 The preceding paragraph is contrary to the common belief 
that each component has an unique requirement for sched- 
uled maintenance in order to protect its inherent level 
of reliability. The validity of this belief was first 
challenged by actuarial analyses of the life histories 
of various components. More recently, the correctness 

of the preceding paragraph has been overwhelmingly demon- 
strated by the massive operational experience of many 
airlines with many different types of components covered 
by Reliability Programs complying with FAA Advisory Cir- 
cular 120-17. 

2.3.14 It is possible to change the answers to the five questions 
in the decision diagram by improved technology. It is 
hoped that Aircraft Integrated Data Systems (AIDS), for 
example, will reliably indicate reduced resistance to 
various modes of failure of many components during normal 
airline operations. If this is determined to be possible, 
many "No" answers to questions (a) and (b) will become 
"Yes" answers. Answers may also be changed by various 
developments in the field of non-destructive test tech- 
niques, built-in test equipment, etc. 

2.3.15 The questions in Figure 1 are intended to determine main- 
tenance tasks having potential effectiveness for possible 
inclusion in a scheduled maintenance program. However, 

it is probable that many of these "potentially" beneficial 
scheduled tasks would not be "desirable" even though such 
tasks could improve reliability. This might be true when 
operating safety is not affected by failure or the cost of 
the scheduled maintenance task is greater than the value 
of such resulting benefits as reduced incidence of com- 
ponent premature removal, reduced incidence of departure 
delays, etc. Additional diagrams are used to assess the 
"desirability" of those scheduled maintenance actions which 
have potential effectiveness. This is accomplished by 
Figures 2 and 3 of Appendix 1. 


2.3 (Continued) 

2.3.16 Figure 2 selects those tasks which must be done because 
of operating safety or hidden function considerations. 
Figure 3 selects those tasks which should be done because 
of economic considerations. 

2.3.17 Figure 2 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers of 
questions c and d in Figure 1, and selects those tasks 
which must be done. 

2.3.18 For the operating safety question, at least one task must 
be listed for each failure mode having a Yes answer to 
question c of Figure 1. An explanation should be given 
for any question c tasks not selected. 

2.3.19 For the hidden function question, normally at least one 
task must be listed for each hidden function having a Yes 
answer to Figure 1, question d. If a task is not selected, 
as permitted by Appendix 3, an explanation must be provided. 

2.3.20 Figure 3 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers in 
Figure 1, questions b and e and select those tasks which 
should be done because of economic considerations. 

2.3.21 A key question in Figure 3 is the first, "Does real and 
applicable data* show desirability of scheduled task?" 
A "Yes" answer is appropriate if there is : 

(1) Prior knowledge from other aircraft that the 
scheduled maintenance tasks had substantial 
evidence of being truly effective and economically 
worthwhile, and 

(2) The system/component configurations of the old and 
new airplanes are sufficiently similar to conclude 
that the task will be equally effective for the 
new airplane. 

2.3.22 The question "Does failure prevent dispatch" refers to 
whether the item will be on the Minimum Equipment List 

2.3.23 The question "Is elapsed time for correction of failure 
> 0.5 Hr." refers to whether corrective action can be 
accomplished without a delay during a no»*al transit stop. 

2.3.24 When a task "requires evaluation" it is important that 
the frequency of the failure and the coat of carrying 
out the task are taken into consideration 

See Glossary. 


2.4 Aircraft Structure Analysis Method 

The method for determining the content of the scheduled maintenance 
program for structure is: 

a) Identify the significant structural items.* 

b) Identify their failure modes and failure effects. 

c) Assess the potential effectiveness of scheduled in- 
spections of structure. 

d) Assess the desirability of those inspections of 
structure which do have potential effectiveness. 

2.4.1 The static structure will be treated as hereafter described. 
Additionally, the mechanical elements of structural com- 
ponents, such as doors, emergency exits, and flight control 
surfaces will be treated individually by the processes de- 
scribed in Section 2.3. 

2.4.2 The decision tree diagram, Figure 1 of Appendix 1, facil- 
itates the definition of scheduled inspections of structure 
having potential effectiveness. There are five key questions, 

(a) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by 
routine flight crew monitoring? 

(b) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by 
in situ maintenance or unit test? 

(c) Does failure mode have a direct adverse effect 
upon operating safety? 

(d) Is the function hidden from the viewpoint of the 
flight crew? 

(e) Is there an adverse relationship between age and 

2.4.3 The answer to question (a) is normally No. However, if 
in-flight instrumentation is developed which permits de- 
tection of incipient structural failures then the answer 
could be Yes. 

2.4.4 If the answer to question (b) is Yes, there are methods 
available to detect incipient conditions before undesir- 
able conditions occur. It would be expected that all 
redundant external and internal structure would be in 
this category. NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes 
to question (b) are part of the Structural Inspection 
program. This program is an On Condition progra*. 

* See Glossary. 

- 11 


2. 4 (Continued) 

2.4.5 If the answer to question (c) is Yes, there is a failure 
mode which has a- direct, adverse effect on operating safety 
for which there is no effective incipient failure detection 
method. It would be expected that non-redundant primary 
structure would be in this category. See Appendix 2 for 
explanation of "direct adverse effect on operating safety". 
NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (c) 
are part of the Hard Time limitation (usually total time 

or total cycle limits) maintenance program. 

2.4.6 If the answer to question (d) is Yes, there is a function 
required of this element of structure that is not regularly 
used during normal flight operations. Some inspection or 
test is therefore necessary to ensure that this function 
has a high probability of being available when required. 
Tail bumper structure and structure provided for wheels 

up landing are typical structural examples. NOTE: Tasks 
resulting from a Yes answer to question (d) are part of 
the Structural Inspection program. 

2.4.7 Structures would be expected to have a Yes answer to ques- 
tion (e) but only in a very long total time envelope. The 
tasks performed as a result of Yes answers to the other 
questions are capable of detecting deterioration prior to 
failure of these items. 

2.4.8 It is probable that some of these "potentially" beneficial 
scheduled inspections would not be desirable, even if such 
tasks would improve reliability. This might be true when 
airworthiness is not affected by failure and the cost of 
the scheduled inspection is greater than the value of the 
resulting benefits. Therefore, additional diagrams are 
used to assess the desirability of those scheduled tasks 
which have potential effectiveness. This is accomplished 
by Figures 2, 4 and 5 of Appendix 1. A No answer to all 
questions is unlikely for structure. If it occurs, the 
item is included in Condition Monitoring. 

2.4.9 Figure 2 selects those tasks that must be done because of 
operating safety or hidden function considerations. 

2.4.10 Figures 4 and 5 of Appendix 1 establish internal and external 
class numbers for structural items. The class numbers take 
into account vulnerability to failure, consequences of failure. 
The class numbers are to be used as guides for setting internal 
and external inspection frequencies. 

2.4.11 The items to be evaluated by Figures 4 and 5 are those termed 
"structurally significant" . 


2.4 (Continued) 

2.4.12 Each item is first rated for each of five characteristics 
per Figure 4 (fatigue resistance, corrosion resistance, 
crack propagation resistance, degree of redundancy and 
fatigue test rating). 

2.4.13 Each item is then given an overall rating (R No.) per 
Figure 4 which considers all of the above ratings and 
combines them by judgment into a single overall rating 
(R No.) representing a relative level of structural in- 
tegrity of the item. In general, the overall R No. for 
an item is equal to or less than the fatigue resistance 
or corrosion resistance rating for the item, whichever 
is lesser. 

2.4.14 The internal and external class numbers for each item are 
then determined by reference to Figure 5. Note that some 
items have both internal and external class numbers. This 
occurs for those internal items which have some probability 
of the internal item's condition being evident by some ex- 
ternal condition. In these cases the item as described is 
visible internally and the "internal" inspection specified 
refers to the item as described. The "external" inspection 
of this item refers to that portion of the external struc- 
ture which is adjacent to the internal item and which may 
yield some indication of the internal item's condition. 
Therefore, when an external inspection is specified for 

an internal item it refers to the adjacent external struc- 
ture and not the internal item itself. 

2. 5 Aircraft Engine Analysis Method 

The method for determining the content of the scheduled engine 
maintenance program is : 

a) Identify the systems and their significant items. 

b) Identify their functions, failure modes and failure 

c) Define scheduled maintenance tasks having potential 
effectiveness relative to the control of operational 

d) Assess the desirability of scheduling those tasks having 
potential effectiveness. 

e) Determine initial sampling thresholds where appropriate. 

2.5.1 The engine as a whole and each significant engine item 
will be treated as described below. 

13 - 


2.5 (Continued) 

2.5.2 The decision tree diagram, Figure 1 of Appendix 1, facil- 
itates the definition of scheduled inspections having 
potential effectiveness. There are five key questions. 

NOTE: Questions (a), (b), and (c) must be answered for 
each failure mode, question (d) for each function, 
and question (e) for the item as a whole. 

(a) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by 
routine flight crew monitoring? 

(b) Is reduction in failure resistance detectable by 
in situ maintenance or unit test? 

(cj Does failure mode have a direct adverse effect 
upon operating safety? 

(d) Is the function hidden from the viewpoint of the 
flight crew? 

(e) Is there an adverse relationship between age and 

2.5.3 If the answer to question (a) is Yes, there are methods 
available through monitoring the normal in-flight instru- 
mentation (including computerized Flight Log Monitoring) 
to detect incipient conditions before undesirable system 
effects occur. A Yes answer does not reauire a maintenance 
task. If the answer is No, there is no in-flight monitor- 
ing which can detect reduction in failure resistance. 
NOTE: Tasks resulting from in-flight monitoring are part 
of non-scheduled maintenance. 

2.5.4 If the answer to question (b) is Yes, there is a maintenance 
task, not requiring engine dis-assembly , that has potential 
effectiveness in detecting incipient conditions before un- 
desirable system effects occur. Tasks may include inspec- 
tion, servicing, testing, etc. NOTE: Tasks resulting from 
Yes answers to question (b) are part of the On Condition 
maintenance program. 

2.5.5 If the answer to question (c) is Yes, this engine component 
has a failure mode with direct , adverse effect on operating 
safety. It is necessary to examine the mechanism of failure 
and identify the single cells or simple assemblies where the 
failure initiated. Specific total time, or total flight 
cvcle, limitations may be assigned these components to 
minimize the probability of operational failures. NOTE: 
Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (c) are 

Dart of either the Hard Time limitation maintenance program, 
or the On Condition maintenance program. 

- 14 - 


2.5 (Continued) 

2.5.6 If the answer to question (d) is Yes, there is a function 
required of this engine component that is not evident to 
the flight crew when the component fails. Some scheduled 
task may be necessary to assure a reasonably high proba- 
bility that this function is available when required. 
NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer to question (d) 
may be part of either the Hard Time limitation or the 

On Condition maintenance program. 

2.5.7 It is expected that the answer to question (e) is always 
Yes for structural engine components, but that their 
expected life is very long relative to the usual engine 
inspection periods. If tasks defined by questions (a) 
through (d) are inadequate to control wear or deteriora- 
tion of engine components, additional tasks should be 
listed here. NOTE: Tasks resulting from a Yes answer 

to question (e) are part of either the Hard Time limitation 
or the On Condition maintenance program. 

2.5.8 Engine components for which no scheduled tasks are selected 
are included in Condition Monitoring. 

2.5.9 The questions in Figure 1 are intended to determine main- 
tenance tasks having potential effectiveness for possible 
inclusion in a scheduled maintenance program. However, 

it is probable that many of these "potentially" beneficial 
scheduled tasks would not be "desirable" even though such 
tasks could improve reliability. This might be true when 
operating safety is not affected by failure or the cost 
of the scheduled maintenance task is greater than the value 
of such resulting benefits as reduced incidence of component 
premature removal, reduced incidence of departure delays, 
etc. Additional diagrams are used to assess the "desir- 
ability" of those scheduled maintenance actions which have 
potential effectiveness. This is accomplished by Figures 

2 and 3 of Appendix 1. 

2.5.10 Figure 2 selects those tasks which must be done because of 
operating safety or hidden function considerations. Figure 

3 selects those tasks which should be done because of 
economic considerations. 

2.5.11 Figure 2 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers of 
questions c and d in Figure 1, and selects those tasks 
which must be done. 

2.5.12 For the operating safety question, at least one task must 
be listed for each failure mode having a Yes answer to 
question c of Figure 1. An explanation should be given 
for any question c tasks not selected. 


2.5 (Continued) 

2.5.13 For the hidden function question, normally at least one 
task must be listed for each hidden function having a 
Yes answer to Figure 1, question d. If a task is. not 
selected, as permitted by Appendix 3, an explanation 
must be provided. 

2.5.14 Figure 3 assesses tasks listed against the Yes answers 
in Figure 1, questions (b) and (e) and selects those 
tasks which should be done because of economic consider- 

2.5.15 A key question in Figure 3 is the first, "Does real and 
applicable data show desirability of scheduled task?" 

A "Yes" answer is appropriate if there is: 

(1) Prior knowledge from other aircraft that the 
scheduled maintenance tasks had substantial 
evidence of being truly effective and econom- 
ically worthwhile, and 

(2) The system /component configurations of the old 
and new airplanes are sufficiently similar to 
conclude that the task will be equally effective 
for the new airplane. 

2.5.16 The question "Does failure prevent dispatch" refers to 
whether the item will be on the Minimum Equipment List 
(MEL). The answer to question (b) is expected to always 
be Yes for engine components that cause engine failure. 

2.5.17 The question "Is elapsed time for correction of failure 
> 0.5 Hr." refers to whether corrective action can be 
accomplished without a delay during a normal transit stop, 

2.5.18 When a task "requires evaluation" it is important that 
the frequency of the failure and the cost of carrying 
out the task are taken into consideration. 

2.5.19 Engine tasks are included in the Threshold Sampling main- 
tenance program. This program is described below. 

2.5.20 The Threshold Sampling maintenance program is intended to 
recognize the On Condition design characteristics of 
modern Turbo-Jet engines, while sampling to control re- 
liability. This program uses repetitive sampling to 

1) The condition of engine components. 

2) The advisability for continued operation to the 
next sampling limit, and 


2.5 (Continued) 

3) The next sampling limit, threshold, or sampling 
band . 

2.5.21 Initial sampling thresholds are based on: 

1) The design of the engine under study, the results 
of developmental testing, and prior service ex- 

2) The results of previous engine programs, 

3) The fact that samples are available from engines 
removed for all causes at virtually all ages. This 
means that knowledge of the condition of engines 

is available over the complete continuum of time 
from start of operation to the highest time ex- 
perienced, and 

4) The fact that most engine design problems become 
apparent and can be controlled well within any 
established limits or thresholds. 

2.5.22 The Threshold Sampling program establishes the initial 
sampling threshold. Operators are subsequently responsible 

1) Evaluating the samples obtained from the initial 

2) Determining the next sampling threshold, and 

3) Determining the number to be sampled at the next 

2.5.23 Threshold Sampling is normally accomplished by inspecting 
the parts or systems of engines that are removed and ac- 
cessible in the shop. These engines provide samples over 
a full range of ages without waiting for the threshold to 
be reached. The results of inspecting these samples are 
used to determine the future program. When samples are 
not available from engines that are in the shop, sched- 
uled samples or in situ inspections may be required. 

2.6 Program Development Administration 

Regulatory Authority participation is encouraged as early and as 
thoroughly as possible in all phases of working group activity. 
It is recognized that the Regulatory Authority will later be 
asked to approve the proposed program resulting from these efforts. 
Therefore, the Regulatory Authority participation must necessarily 



2.6 (Continued) 

be restricted to technical participation, contributing their own 
knowledge, and observing the activities of the working group. 
Regulatory Authority approval of working group recommendations 
is not implied by the participation of Regulatory Authority 
members in working group sessions. The following activity 
phases will apply. 

Phase I . 

Steering Group general familiarization 

Phase II. a) Working Group or Working Activity Training. 


Preparation of first draft Significant Items 
List. (Ref. 2.7.1) 


Establish functions and failure modes ap- 
plicable to the Significant Items. 

d) Preparation of Figures 1 thru 5 decision 

diagram replies and supporting data for each 
system and significant item. 

Phase III. a) Evaluation of manufacturer's technical data and 
recommended tasks by the Working Groups' air- 
line personnel and meeting with manufacturer to 
make necessary revisions and prepare task recom- 


Development of task frequency recommendations. 
(This phase is meant to follow Phase III. a). 

A Steering Group member should participate 
in all Phase III activity. 

Phase IV. 

Presentation to Steering Group (meeting with 
each Working Group or Activity Chairman). 

Phase V. 

Preparation and presentation of the Steering 
Group's proposal to the Regulatory Authority. 


Supporting Technical Data 

The following supporting technical data will be provided in 
printed form, together with adequate cross-references on the 
records of replies to the decision diagrams. 

Steering Committee audits are required for these steps before proceeding. 


2.7 (Continued) 

2.7.1 Maintenance Significant Items List 

This list will include by ATA System, the name, quantity 
per airplane, prime manufacturer part number, vendor 
name and part number for each item considered by the 
Working Group/Activity to require individual analysis. 

2.7.2 Significant Items Data 

a) Description of each significant item and its 
function(s) . 

b) Listing of its failure mode(s) and effects. 

c) Expected failure rate. 

d) Hidden functions. 

e) Need to be on M.E.L. 

f) Redundancy (may be unit, system or system 
management ) . 

g) Potential indications of reduced failure 

2.7.3 System Data 

a) Description of each system and its function(s). 

b) Listing of any failure modes and effects not con- 
sidered in item data. 

c) Hidden functions not considered in item data. 

- 19 



Inherent Level of Reliability and Safety - That level which is built into the unit 

and therefore inherent in its design. This 
is the highest level of reliability and safety that can be expected from a 
unit, system or aircraft. To achieve higher levels of reliability gen- 
erally requires modification or redesign. 

Maintenance Significant Items - Those maintenance items that are judged by 

the manufacturer to be relatively the most 
important from a safety or reliability standpoint, or from an 
economic standpoint. 

Structural Significant Items - Those local areas of primary structure which 

are judged by the manufacturer to be relatively 
the most important from a fatigue or corrosion vulnerability stand- 
point or from a failure effects standpoint. 

Operational Reliability - The ability to perform the required functions within 
acceptable operational standards for the time period 

Effective Incipient Failure Detection - That maintenance action which will 

reliably detect incipient failures 
if they exist. That is, detect the pending failure of a unit or 
system before that system fails. For example, detection of turbine 
blade cracks prior to blade failure. 

Real and Applicable Data - Those data about real, operating hardware that is 
similar enough to the hardware under discussion 
to be applicable to the design of maintenance programs for the cur- 
rent hardware. 

Reduction in Failure Resistance - The deterioration of inherent (design) 

levels of reliability. As failure resis- 
tance reduces, failures increase; resulting in lower reliability. 
If reduction in failure resistance can be detected, maintenance 
can be performed prior to the point where reliability is adversely 

Function - The characteristic actions of units, systems and aircraft. 

Failure Modes - The ways in which units, systems and aircraft deteriorate 
and can be considered to have failed. 

Fai_ure Effects - The consequence of failure. 

Potential Effectiveness - Capable of being effective (maintenance action) 
to some degree/ 



GLOSSARY (Continued) 

Routine Flight Crew Monitoring - That monitoring that is inherent in normally 

operating the aircraft. For example, the 
pre-flight check list, or the normal operation of the aircraft and 
its components. Does not include monitoring of "back-up" equipment 
that is normally not tested as a part of a normal flight. 



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The following elaborates on the term "direct and adverse effect on operating 

During the design process considerable attention is given to system 
and component failure effect analysis to ensure that failures that 
result in loss of function do not immediately jeopardize operating 
safety. In many cases, redundancy can cause the consequences of a 
first failure to be benign. In other cases, protective devices serve 
this purpose. Although it may not be possible to continue to dispatch 
the airplane without correcting the failure and although it may indeed 
be desirable to make an unscheduled landing after failure, the failure 
cannot be considered to have an immediate adverse effect upon operating 
safety. The inclusion of the word direct in the phrase "direct adverse 
effect upon operating safety" means an effect which results from a 
specific failure mode occurring by itself and not in combination with 
other possible failure modes. 

Certification requirements ensure that a transport category aircraft 
has very few failure modes which have a direct adverse effect upon 
operating safety. 

- 25 




A component is considered to have a "hidden function" if either of the follow- 
ing exists: 

1. The component has a function which is normally active whenever the 
system is used, but there is no indication to the flight crew when 
that function ceases to perform. 

2. The component has a function which is normally inactive and there 
is no prior indication to the flight crew that the function will 
not perform when called upon. The demand for active performance 
will usually follow another failure and the demand may be activated 
automatically or manually. 

Examples of components possessing hidden functions exist in a bleed air system. 
A bleed air temperature controller normally controls the bleed air temperature 
to a maximum of 400° F. In addition, there is a pylon shutoff valve which in- 
corporates a secondary temperature control, should the temperature exceed 400° F. 
A duct overheat switch is set to warn the flight crew of a temperature above 
480° F, in which event they can shut off the air supply from the engine by 
actuating the pylon shutoff valve switch. There is no duct temperature 

The bleed air temperature controller has a hidden active function of control- 
ling the air temperature. Since there is a secondary temperature control in 
the pylon valve and since there is no duct temperature indicator, the flight 
crew has no indication of when the temperature control function ceases to be 
performed by the temperature controller. Also, the flight crew has no in- 
dication prior to its being called into use that the secondary temperature 
control function of the pylon valve will perform. Therefore, the pylon valve 
has a hidden inactive function. For a similar reason, the duct overheat 
warning system has a hidden inactive function. And the pylon valve has a 
hidden inactive function (manual shutoff) since at no time in normal use 
does the flight crew have to manually close the valve. 

The hidden function definition includes reference to "no indications to the 
flight crew" of performance of that function. If there are indications to 
the flight crew, the function is evident (unhidden). However, to qualify 
as an evident function, these indications must be obvious to the flight crew 
during their normal duties, without special monitoring (bear in mind, however, 
that special monitoring is encouraged as a part of the maintenance program to 
make hidden functions into evident ones). 

It is recognized that, in the performance of their normal duties, the flight 
crews operate some systems full time, others once or twice per flight, and 
others less frequently. All of these duties, providing they are done at some 
reasonable frequency, qualify as "normal". It means, for example, that al- 
though an anti-icing system is not used every flight it is used with sufficient 

- 26 - 

APPENDIX 3 (Continued) 

frequency to qualify as a "normal" duty. Therefore, the anti-icing system 
can be said to have an evident (unhidden) function from a flight crew's 
standpoint. On the other hand, certain "emergency" operations which are 
done at very infrequent periods (less than once per month) such as emergency 
gear extension, fuel dump actuation, etc. cannot be considered to be suf- 
ficiently frequent to warrant classification as evident (unhidden) functions. 

The analysis method requires that all hidden functions have some form of 
scheduled maintenance applied to them. However, in those cases where it 
may be difficult to check the operation of hidden functions, it is accept- 
able to assess the operating safety effects of combined failures of the 
hidden function with a second failure which brings the hidden function 
failure to the attention of the flight crew. In the event the combined 
failures do not produce a direct adverse effect on operating safety, then 
the decision whether to apply maintenance to check the pertinent hidden 
function becomes an economic decision to be considered by Figure 3 of 
Appendix 1. 

Note also, in some cases, it is acceptable to accomplish hidden function 
checks of removable components during unscheduled shop visits , providing 
the component has at least one other function which when failed is known 
to the flight crew and which causes the unit to be sent to the shop. Also, 
the hidden function failure mode should have an estimated reliability well 
in excess of the total reliability of the other functions that are evident 
to the flight crew. 

- 27 - 


[The following was subsequently supplied for the record by General 
Jones :] 

Air Force Response to "Airlixe/Maxufacturer Maintenance Program 
Planning Document" 

Upon examination of the document submitted, we find it to be the Airline/ 
Manufacturer Maintenance Planning Document. MSG-2, which the Air Force 
has used since early 1975 as a planning guide for establishing aircraft inspection 

The MSG-2 document outlines engineering analysis methodology and a de- 
cision tree logic for establishing scheduled maintenance requirements. Applica- 
tion of these techniques requires detailed knowledge of aircraft design, the 
engineering ability to identify structurally and functionally significant items 
and accomplishment of a failure modes and effects analysis. The end results of 
this effort are consistently traceable engineering decisions on what portions of 
the aircraft must be inspected, the correct interval between inspections and at 
what level of maintenance the inspection tasks should take place. This approach 
to maintenance inspection tasks will result in more efficient use of the total 
maintenance work force and an increase in the operational availability of our 

In January 1975, Boeing was awarded a contract to apply the airline approach 
to B-52 base level maintenance inspections. This effort was completed in June 
1975 and is forecast to substantially reduce the maintenance manbours expended 
on base level inspections and also result in approximately 2000 fewer downdays 
per year on the fleet. Based upon the success of the B-52 work, the Air Force lias 
established a multi-year program to apply the techniques outlined in the Air- 
line/Manufacturer Maintenance Program Planning Document, MSG-2, to all 
acquisition and in-service aircraft. 


Senator Holmngs. Air Force manpower is planned on a high main- 
tenance and wartime operating posture. Is that correct ? 

General Jones. Yes. sir. For example, our munitions load teams in 
peacetime really need little training but they have to be available for 
war because, in wartime, the munitions loading tends to become a limit- 
ing factor. So. for normal peacetime flying you could have very, very 
few munitions people but for wartime you need a lot of munitions 

T would like to take this report and study it. because I find that in 
calculations on maintenance man-hours per flying hour, the assump- 
tion of what goes into the calculations is so important and there are 
so many different ways of doing maintenance and so many ditferent 
ways of calculating that you can come out with very, very ditferent 
answers with the same title. So I would be very willing to do that. 

Senator IIhllixos. We are not trying to trap you or trick you. 
T just want your honest comment if there is some savings to be had 
with respect to the maintenance program. You have a high cost 
budget, obviously. With respect to airline maintenance, we want 
to find out from some comparables whether we could effect a savings 
there. Are there any economies which could be implemented with re- 
spect to the pilots, the cost of training, the length of time they stay in 
and their actual flight pay, including the fact that as I indicated some 
6 years of the -20 years are dedicated to education, a sort of sabbatical 
off on different trainings. 

In a general sense, what is the Congress denying you ? What is the 
Congress refusing to give you with respect to supporting the Air 
Force? Are you getting all you need from the Congress? 



General Jones. Mr. Chairman, I will be very candid. We do not get 
all we ask for. I am not saying we should get all we ask for. I do not 
mean to imply when I say that that we put fat in the budget. But 
when you in your wisdom look at the total national priorities and total 
national requirements and at what should be allocated to various areas, 
we do get less than what we consider to be the requirement. 


Then trying to put that in the perspective of national requirements 
and other priorities, our concern in the 1976 budget is that the 
AWACS and the B-l be supported. 


Senator Hollings. Would multiple-year funding on that be helpful ? 
I am trying to get to that bathtub you described. 

General Jones. Yes, sir. Multiple-year budgeting would help a good 
deal, or at least an agreed target for multiple-year funding. We fully 
fund each individual airplane, but for the subsequent years we can 
not be sure which way we will go on funding. It would help if we 
could get the B-l and the AWACS supported to the level that came 
out of the authorization act. This included some long leadtime money 
on the B-l, but no production decision, and the six AWACS which 
have been supported by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Also, 
some help is needed in the spare parts for the wartime readiness. The 
Senate restored some of the cuts, but part of the problem would be how 
much of the restoration we will get from Department of Defense. They 
took the total of the Department of Defense and cut it some and then 
the Senate restored some. It would depend on how much that we would 
get back. 

But I would think that if we could sustain these two programs and 
get some back in our WRM, we would be ready to continue the mod- 
ernization and provide a good Air Force. 


I think we manage very, very well. I would be most pleased to have 
anybody come out to our bases and look at our maintenance, as well as 
the airlines. They concede we manage well. 

I would be the first to admit that in all of the services, as in the Air 
Force, there are things that we can continue to do to manage better 
with our people and with our system. I am dedicated to that, to cutting 
overhead, to more efficient use of our people. What I tell my people is 
we are a great Air Force but we can do better and we want people 
who want to be all the way in or all the way out, a highly disciplined 
force, dedicated, selfless, with people who are interested in their 
country. We do have good people. They are working hard. Our main- 
tenance people work harder than anybody else in the Air Force. 


I am an ex-maintenance type myself and spent many years in Europe 
with onr people in the snow and the rain. They are working hard. They 
put in more overtime than any other lame group of people. That does 
not mean though that we cannot somehow change the way we do 

You take one of the reasons the airlines can do so well in their main- 
tenance area is that the 747 has well over 99 percent reliability today 
in its worldwide operations. 


What we need to do is to devote more effort into reliability and the 
maintainability so the equipment does not break as often and when 
it breaks, it is easier to fix. I have taken one initiative in this area. I 
have formed a program office called PRAM. What this means is pro- 
ductivity, reliability, availability, maintainability program office. 

I am giving them a small amount of money to start with and they 
are going to industry and within the Air Force saying we want ideas 
and proposals as to how, if we put in a little seed money, we can im- 
prove this the productivity or the reliability or the maintainability 
and amortize it very quickly — and our people that are in the program 
are very enthused with all of the ideas that are flowing in now. 

That is really the way that we will, in the long term, reduce the 
number of people, to have the equipment break less frequently and 
when it breaks to be able to fix it easier and faster. 


We have made good progress in the F-15 over the F-4. In the F-4, 
to replace the radio we have had to take out the ejection seat because 
of the very compactness. That was the only place they had room for it. 
So when you have to repair a radio you have to count the mainte- 
nance time to pull out that complicated ejection seat and fix the radio 
and put the seat back in. 

The F-15 is much better. We have not found yet that we have that 
sort of problem at all. The F-16 should be even better. That is the 
way I think we will make our major progress in the reduction of 
manpower in the life cycle costs on our airplanes. 


Senator Hollings. What is the status of the C-5? It had a defect 
in the wing at one time, has that been corrected '. 

General Jones. No, sir. With the C-~) we collectively made an 
error — not in buying the (' -5, it is a fine airplane. It is doing yeoman 
service today. It is a good aircraft. But at that time there was a con- 
cept of total program package in research and development and up 
through procurement of the aircraft to meet certain specifications. 
When the airplane was Being developed it did not quite meet those 
specifications and there was a contract that said the contractor must 
deliver this airplane at this price with these specifications. 



A risk was taken to remove some of that weight from the wing in 
order to meet the weight requirements and the payload requirements. 
At the time, the people thought that taking the weight out would not — 
they knew they were taking some degree of risk, I am sure, but they 
did not believe that it would affect the lifetime of the aircraft. It 
turns out that it would have been much wiser to leave that weight in. 
Where does the blame lie ? 

I say part with the contractor, I would say part with the Air Force, 
and the Department of Defense, and maybe in part with Congress. 
I am not blaming it on Congress. I think there is enough blame to go 
around as a result of our saying to that manufacturer, "You said you 
could do this and when it became an impossible task" 

Senator Rollings. How did Congress get part of that? Do you 
know anybody around here who knows how to build a C-5? 

General Jones. Not directly. I almost would rather withdraw those 
words. But in the programing, maybe it was the reluctance to come to 
Congress and say we have a problem and we ought to change our whole 
program. I do not know. I was not in on the program at the time. I 
am just saying that as you look back at the program, it is pretty hard 
to put the finger on any one agency for our ending up with a wing that 
has less strength than it should have. 

no fatigue life 

What this means is that in the long term, the C-5 will not have the 
fatigue life expected, and in the 1980's we would have to quit flying the 
airplane if we did not fix the wing. The C-5 is good today. Our pro- 
gram is to take one airplane and to do the design, the engineering, and 
rework the wing, and we have that money now that has been appropri- 
ated. We will program over a longer period of time the fixing of the 
wings in the C-5 fleet. It is a good airplane. It will remain a good air- 
plane. The only thing the wing fix does is extend the life. It will be 
much cheaper than going out and buying a new airplane, a new C-5 or 
a newly designed airplane that will carry tanks and a comparable ca- 
pabilitv. We have learned that the total program concept is really 
not the way to go, although it was endorsed by everybody in that time 
period. When I say the blame, I think it is primarily the contractor and 
the Air Force and the Department of Defense as opposed to anybody 

program alternative 

Senator Hollings. What is the alternative to the total program con- 
cept ? I am just trying to get the terminology. 


General Jones. In oversimplification, it is fly before buy. In those 
days it was not. Xow we go through the fly before buy. Even that has 
its pitfalls if you go too far in that direction, which means if you do 
not put any leadtime in at all, then you get this bathtub. So what you 
try to do is fly and test the airplane and maybe get a little long lead. 
You do not commit yourself to large buy programs — you need a little 


lead so you do not get the bathtub. After testing, you get to procure- 
ment as opposed to going to a company and saying — going to Rockwell 
and saying, "Build me 244 B-l's and bid on it today," with their hav- 
ing so many unknowns for the days ahead that will come out in the test 
program including realistic costs or performance and all the rest, It is 
divided up now ; fly before buy and then procure. It is working much 
better. It is working on the F-15 and the other weapon systems. 


Senator Hollixgs. Would you explain the reduction in the B-52 
alert rates? What does it save ; and if that works, what about applying 
that to other air-alert systems? 

General Joxes. Other than the B-52, we have very few airplanes 
that are on alert today: some aircraft in Europe, some aircraft in 
the Air Defense Command, but very, very few. The Minuteman in 
its normal operations is on alert. It is not an airplane, but most of 
them are sitting alert. As to costs, I do not have, offhand, the specific 
costs, but what we have done now is restructure our crew requirements 
on the B-52 so it can generate all the airplanes in an emergency and 
maintain a generated capability for a reasonable period of time. As 
an outgrowth of that, we determine how many can be on alert, as 
opposed to having a high number on alert and men for it. Should there 
be an emergency, wo have an ability to change that alert. One of the 
great advantages of the bomber force is to be able to signal our resolve 
as in 1973. when we went on increased alert. In 1973. we probably put 
only one more Minuteman on alert, or two, or some small number, 
because most were normally on alert. But we were able to take the 
bomber fc T, ce and to increase its alert, deploy it if we want to. It is 
based on that requirement that the crews are authorized as opposed 
to a high alert in peacetime. 

It will give us a capability to flex our muscles when necessary for 
political and military purposes. 

Senator Hollixgs. General, is there anything you wish to add? I 
will leave this record open for your review and any additional 


We will keep this record open. I appreciate very much your testi- 
mony here this morning. I, like many around this town, feel badly 
about this charge of Secretary Schlesinger and yet at the same time 
there is a general feeling in this Congress that we have got the best 
defense we have ever had. 

We are lucky in that regard, and I think the appearances of your- 
self and Admiral Ilollowav and General Weyand and the others have 
proved that. This country is lucky; at least you have the confidence of 
the Congress. Yet you get a feel over in the Pentagon we are after you. 
We are just after economy. You know a man said when he came back 
after World War II as he was driving away from National Airport 
and had not seen the Pentagon, and he said. "How many people work 
in a building like that ?" Without batting an eye. the taxi driver said, 


"About half." You see a lot of dedicated people working from early 
morning to late at night, and you see a lot of people in the gym, or 
stretching, or eating, or heading to another club. 

How do you clean that thing out and fret the costs down? The con- 
sultants or auditors prepare your defense Pentagon budget. The costs 
are more than the operation of this entire Congress. These are things 
that we have a hard time understanding. It is not in any way a criti- 
cism of the command and the capability of our Chiefs. I will keep this 
record open, and we appreciate very much your appearance and com- 
ments here this morning. 

General Joxes. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, for those kind words. I 
just want to assure you that we are working as hard as we can to spend 
the taxpayers' money in the proper way. 

We make mistakes. We can make improvements. We are trying to 
minimize our mistakes and trying not to repeat them, and we are dedi- 
cated to do the best possible job. We are trying to find the incentives 
for our people to participate, to innovate, and I think we do well, and 
we can do better. 

Senator Hollixgs. Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to recon- 
vene at the call of the Chair.] 

Written Questions From Senator Cranston to General Jones and the 


service's real growth desire vs. president's 

Senator Cranston. How does your desire for real growth in the Air Force, and 
the Army's and Navy's desire for real growth, square with the President's desire 
to reduce the size of the Federal budget? 

General Jones. In my capacity as Chief of Staff of the Air Force, it would be 
presumptuous of me to address the President's budget priorities. However, the 
President has stated that he supports a strong National defense. As Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force, I recommend to the Secretary of the Air Force and the 
Secretary of Defense the level of funding that is necessary to support the Air 
Force mission. 

The Air Force is not wedded to any arbitrary, internally generated growth 
pattern. Indeed, we would welcome international conditions which would make a 
smaller Air Force appropriate. However, we must recommend an Air Force 
budget that includes modest growth to meet the expanding Soviet threat. While 
U.S. national priorities for defense in general and the Air Force funding in 
particular have declined, the trends in the USSR have been precisely the op- 
posite. The dramatic growth of Soviet forces is far out of proportion to any 
rational perception of threat or equilibrium. In my judgment, if the present 
trends are permitted to continue to diverge, the U.S. cannot hope to maintain 
the precarious equilibrium which our technological superiority has so far pre- 
served. Over time, the sheer preponderance of increasing numbers and improved 
capability in Soviet strategic and general purpose forces must inevitably tilt the 
military balance in their favor. It is a matter of utmost importance to assess the 
risks and the impact on National security of such a shift and to set the spending 
priorities accordingly. 


Senator Craxstox. I understand that before the end of the decade you will 
have increased the number of wings in the Air Force from 22 to 26. To accomplish 
this you will have converted approximately 30,000 support and auxiliary per- 
sonnel into positions with combat units. Budgetary constraints persuade me that 
we could make some real savings by eliminating most — if not all — of these 
positions. Why did you reject that course of action? 

General Jones. The Air Force tactical fighter force ^presently consists of 26 
organizationally structured wings. However, for such reasons as combat attri- 
tion in Southeast Asia and limited production of new equipment, our present 
force is underequipped. Our plan is to gradually increase the unit equipage 
within the 20 wings to bring them to full combat capability by 1981. 



To achieve this posture we will modernize our total force through the intro- 
duction of new production aircraft such as the F-15. F-16. and the A-10. These 
aircraft, with their improved capabilities and lower life cycle costs, will allow us 
to attain our necessary strength and yet remain within manpower ceilings and 
budgetary constraints. 

I would briefly like to explain how we arrived at our 26 wing posture. In the 
guidance issued by the Secretary of Defense, the defense of Europe is given first 
priority after the defense of the United States. This guidance further requires 
that our force lie able to mount a strong initial conventional defense in Europe, 
sustained for as long as our adversaries are capable of fighting. Moreover, we are 
directed to prepare for a simultaneous minor contingency elsewhere. Require- 
ments based on this combination of contingencies determine our force size. This 
force requirement is then modified by the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to meet the strategy at a prudent level of risk within the constraint of reasonable 

In the process of considering current fiscal realities, the 26 active and 10 
reserve wing level represents the best balance between combat capability and 
resource availability that the Air Force, the JCS, and the Department of Defense 
can achieve. 

Using the President's FY 1976 P>udjret request as a baseline, the manpower 
cost to accommodate full of the 26 wing structure is 5.000 spaces, not 
80,000. Technological advances and reductions in support would provide these 
5,000 spaces from within requested manpower levels. 

Tberefore. we feel our fully equipped 20 wing posture is necessary and we have 
structured a force which achieves our objective at the least cost. 

Senator Cranston. How many additional aircraft will be needed to supply the 
new wings? What are your estimates for the total procurement and annual opera- 
tion and maintenance costs? 


General Jones. Two hundred ninety-six additional UE aircraft will be required 
to fully equip 26 Tactical Fighter Wings by FY 81. 

In achieving this posture we will simultaneously modernize our total force 
through the introduction of new production aircraft such as the F-15. F-lt;. and 
the A-10 which offer improved capabilities at lower life cycle costs. This will allow 
us to attain our necessary strength and yet remain within manpower ceilings 
and budgetary constraints. 

Using the President's FY 1070 Budjret Request as a baseline, the manpower 
cost to accommodate full equipage of the 26 winy structure is 5. (to spaces. 
Technological advances and reductions in support would provide these 5.000 
spaces from within requested manpower levels. Reductions in F— 1 aircraft, phase- 
out of A-7 and F-105 aircraft and minor adjustments in the F-lll force between 
FY 1070 and FY 1981 will result in substantial savings of military personnel. The 
savings projected to accrue from the equipment design objectives of our newer 
aircraft will permit us to attain full equipage of our 20 wing force within pro- 
jected manning constraints through actions that produce manpower economies 
witli the least degradation of capability. 

The Air Force flying hour program will not increase as these new aircraft are 
phased into the inventory. This will be possible as a result of increased use of 
simulators and refined management of the flying hours on the basis of training 
events (called the Designed operational Capability). 

Therefore the 20 Tactical Fighter Winy structure can be supported from within 
programmed aircraft procurements (F-15, F-16, A-10), manpower and flying 
hour levels. 

"quiet revolution" tx AIHPOWEH 

Senator Cranston. John Finney reported in the New York Times of October 12 
that Air Force planners foresee a day some 10 or more years in the future when 
fighter bombers will be able to take off from American bases, be refueled in flight, 
carry out tactical strikes and return after refueling. -Mr. Finney notes that, if 
implemented, tins plan would impinge on the traditional domain of the Navy's 
aircraft carriers. Mr. Finney also quotes you. General Jones, as promoting the 
concept and talking in terms of "a quiet, dimly ]>ereeived revolution*' in air 
power. How does this "quiet revolution" affect your budget planning for FY 77. 
and for the next 5 to 10 years'; 


General Jones. First, let me make the observation that ''quiet revolution" is a 
term which describes changes in our tactical air power capabilities whose global 
employment is foreseen in the coming years. These changes are the significant 
advances in capabilities offered by our long-delayed force modernization pro- 
grams. Specifically, 1 am speaking of systems such as our new tactical aircraft, the 
F-15, F-16, and A-10 ; our airspace surveillance and control aircraft, the AWACS ; 
and programs to enhance the survivability of our systems, such as the EF-111, 
RPVs, and new standoff weapons. In addition to these tactical improvements.' 
foreseen improvements in our refueling capability, i.e.. the Advanced Tanker 
Cargo Aircraft I ATCA), and programmed airlift improvements will further con- 
tribute to the effectiveness with which we can employ our tactical forces. 

The technological advances embodied in all of these new systems will pro- 
duce a lead in weapon > quality which. I feel, will largely offset the preponder- 
ance of numbers enjoyed by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries. The 
fulfillment of this '-quiet revolution"' is predicated on the acquisition of these 
systems in .suffici, nt numbers to allow for the full use of our technological lead. 
Acquisition of sufficient numbers of these systems implies long-term buys if 
year-to-year monetary requirements are to be kept acceptably low. 


With regard to keeping costs low. the F-16 and the A-10 are two examples 
of significantly less expensive aircraft compared with other modern aircraft 
systems. Their unit costs as well as their projected annual operations and main- 
tenance costs and overall life cycle costs are all down, comparatively. These 
aircraft were designed to be less sophisticated: thus, they cost less ami require 
fewer operator and support personnel and are easier to maintain. The ATCA 
concept, in terms of utilizing off-the-shelf technology and minimally modifying 
an inbeing commercial aircraft rather than investing in costly research and 
development work, is another example of how we plan to keep system costs down. 

In order to take full advantage of this "quiet revolution" in capability we 
have included the aforementioned systems in our FY 77 budget request and out- 
year programs. We anticipate continued emphasis on the acquisition portion 
of our budget, while at the same time, striving to maintain current combat 
capabilities through more efficient operational procedures and less expensive 
systems. AVe envision this to be characteristic of our budgetary requirements 
for the next five to ten years. 


Senator Cranston. How should this "quiet revolution" affect the planning 
of the Budget Committee and the Congress? For example, in the next few years. 
the Congress will have to make decisions on major outlays on carriers, escort 
ships such as the strike cruiser, and a number of very expensive aircraft to 
compliment a carrier. What particular guidance can you give us 7 

General Jones. This "quiet revolution." as I call it, is occurring because of 
significant increases in the capabilities of our new tactical aircraft and their 
subsystems. A\ 'ith respect to the planning of the Budget Committee and Congress, 
continued Congressional support of these Air Force programs will be necessary 
if the fruits of this "quiet revolution" are to be fully realized. Funding of these 
new systems will be necessary over the next five to ten years and beyond as we 
procure and bring them on line. 

Concerning our force structure philosophy, we design our forces to perform 
specific primary missions levied on the Air Force by statute. The flexibility in- 
herent in our systems allows us to perform certain collateral missions, also spec 
ified by statute. Our systems are in no way intended to perform the primary 
missions of the other services. The collateral support our systems provide is a 
function of their flexibility and is not a driving factor in either our force struc- 
ture or systems acquisition rationale. I would emphasize that all the services 
are integral to a synergistic national security posture, with each service per- 
forming specific primary tasks. Mutual support and close cooperation among 
the services is fundamental to achieving the highest possible productivity of 
each. We do have different perspectives, of course, but there is no parochialism 
and there is strong mutual support across the board. It is the job of all the 
Service Chiefs, individually and collectively as the Joint Chiefs, to recommend 
the minimum essential systems necessary to protect U.S. security. Just which 
new systems and in what quantity are questions that all of us must consider 
long and hard in terms of each service's statutory responsibilities. 



Senator Cranston. Each service has developed its own air force, stressing 
its own operating environment and supposedly unique capabilities. The Army 
has about 11,000 aircraft ; the Air Force 9,400 : the Navy 5,100 ; and the Marine 
Corps 1,300. How can we avoid needless duplication and achieve real budgetary 
savings in this area ? For example, the Army wants 481 Advanced Attack Heli- 
copters for close support of ground forces. The entire procurement package is 
expected to cost over $3 billion. The Air Force, on the other hand, has chosen 
the A-10 for its close support mission. The entire procurement package for the 
A-10 is expected to cost another $3 billion. 


General Jones. The duplication is more apparent than real. In fact, there is 
some overlap in capabilities among our various aircraft but within the Depart- 
ment of Defense (DOD), the four Services establish and maintain air elements 
to perform assigned roles and missions. These air elements are tailored to meet 
specific Service mission requirements and collectively contribute to the total 
US aerial firepower available. 

The Air Force provides General Purpose Tactical Air Forces which meet a 
wide range of responsibilities as promulgated by current laws, directives, and 
agreements. These responsibilities include : gain and maintain general air su- 
premacy ; establish local air superiority, defend against enemy air forces ; con- 
trol vital air areas ; provide close air support to the Army and other ground 
forces ; and provide air forces for joint amphibious operations, airborne opera- 
tions, theater airlift to the Armed Forces, tactical air reconnaissance, and inter- 
diction of enemy land power communications. Collateral responsibilities 
include interdiction of enemy sea power, antisubmarine warfare, protection of 
shipping, and aerial minelaying. The Air Force has purposely structured its 
tactical air (TACAIR) forces to meet its primary responsibilities. 

To make the most efficient use of the combat capability of our tactical air 
force, we employ Air Force TACAIR as an entity under a single manager — the 
Air Force Component Commander (AFCC). This enables us to apply the full 
capabilities of Air Force TACAIR in response to the direction of the theater com- 
mander. The AFCC. through his Tactical Air Control System (TAGS), cen- 
trally controls assigned or attached resources and integrates all tactical air 
operations to meet a variety of needs throughout a theater of operations. Tactical 
airlift and tactical reconnaissance missions, as well as combat fighter opera- 
tions (close air support, air interdiction and counter air) are employed to 
meet the threat in concert with the overall land campaign. 

The Air Force employs a "systems approach" in order to most effectively and 
efficiently apply the full capabilities of TACAIR at the most decisive points. 
The Air Force tactical control system, fighters, airlift and reconnaissance forces. 
support personnel, and equipment offer an unparalleled capability to meet the 
air support requirements of ground commanders, as well as the broader re- 
quirements of the theater commander. Air Force TACAIR, applied through 
centralized control, possesses a flexibility unconstrained by geography and arbi- 
trary boundaries. It is a system capable of applying decisive firepower at the 
critical time and place. 


My view on the Navy and Marine Corps is that their air elements are tailored 
for specialized operations, sea lane control, and fleet defense for the Navy 
and amphibious operations for the Marine Corps. These forces have a specific 
job to do. In the case of the Navy, they must be able to establish and maintain 

local air superiority in areas of naval operations and control the sea lanes in 
support of armed conflict in Europe. Without the vast amounts of ammunition 
and supplies required to conduct a large-scale land battle, we cannot sustain 
combat operations for a very long j>eriod of time. Marine Corps aviation to sup- 
port the Marine mission of amphibious operations is needed during the critical 
phases of getting an amphibious force ashore. 


In regards to Army aviation, the attack helicopter is organic to the Army 
ground maneuver unit and is an extension of organic firepower. It is to be em- 


ployed with, or to the rear of, ground forces along the forward edge of the battle 
area (FEBA) to provide helicopter escort and suppressive fire, to counter enemy 
armor at the FEBA, and to counter enemy armor penetrations behind friendly 

The attack helicopter and Air Force close air support offer the ground com- 
mander a complementary capability in terms of a wider spectrum of fire support, 
enhanced responsiveness, flexibility and capability. Because of the limited range, 
speed and firepower of attack helicopters as compared to Air Force fixed-wing 
close air support capabilities, the Air Force does not consider the attack heli- 
copter as duplicating Air Force close air support. 

General Creighton W. Abrams, who commanded the U.S. Military Assistance 
Command in Vietnam, made the following remarks in support of Air Force 
TACAIR in the close air support role, during his testimony before the House 
Armed Services Committee in 1973 : "Close air support, as provided by the Air 
Force for somebody in the position I was, the overall commander, there is no way 
to replace that with helicopters. The power of it — first, it can generate more 
power, two or three squadrons are going to generate more hitting power than any 
combination of helicopters. I am talking about sheer power in terms of tonnage, 
bombs on the target . . . because high performance fixed-wing aircraft carry a 
much greater payload. And you can focus that very quickly." 

The essential difference between Army aviation and Air Force TACAIR is 
that TACAIR responds functionally to theaterwide requirements while Army 
aviation assets are employed as an organic element of the ground force in opera- 
tions such as logistics support, battlefield observation, command and control, and 

In an effort to make the most of our existing combat capabilities, we are train- 
ing jointly with the other Services and are looking for ways to provide mutual 
support. Use of Air Force aircraft to assist the Navy in its sea control mission is 
an excellent example. The Air Force will continue to seek the fullest utilization 
of its weapons, techniques and capabilities in fulfilling our assigned roles and 
missions. In so doing, we will continue to work closely with the other Services to 
avoid unnecessary overlap. 


Senator Cranston. What do you see as the future mission of air power based 
on the lessons of the Middle East War? Some strategists have observed that the 
1973 Middle East War showed the tactical fighter to be extremely vulnerable to 
cheap defensive missiles. Less than 5 r / f of the Israeli fighter losses resulted from 
air-to-air combat ; 95% were credited to the array of Soviet-made ground-to-air 
missiles in the bands of Egyptian and Syrian troops. 

General Jones. When comparing the cost of an aircraft to the cost of a surface- 
to-air missile (SAM), it appears that the SAM or anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) 
weapon provides an inexpensive counter to the relatively expensive aircraft. How- 
ever, these weapons should not be compared on a one for one basis, rather they 
must be compared in the larger context of an overall system. 

The Soviets have built a large and modern surface-to-air defensive system 
which has undergone considerable improvement in the last decade. This system 
encompasses literally thousands of fixed and mobile SAMS, a multitude of sophis- 
ticated AAA weapons, and an extensive and complex net of early warning, ground 
controlled intercept and fire control radars. This aggregate air defense ground 
environment is a very expensive venture — expensive to procure and expensive 
to maintain. 

The development of this elaborate defense system is in direct response to the 
recognized effectiveness of airborne weapon systems. Thus, the Soviets and their 
allies have been forced to concentrate considerable effort and expense into de- 
velopment of a system specifically to counter the threat of modern air power. 

Similarly, it is partially in light of improved surface-to-air weapons systems 
that we have undertaken several initiatives to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. 
airpower. Some examples of these initiatives include: procurement of more ad- 
vanced electronic countermeasure and avionics systems: development and pro- 
curement of improved delivery systems and war reserve munitions leading to a 
wide range of stand-off and close-in kill options; and. aircrew combat training 
in a realistic threat environment. These initiatives consider the realities and 
scope of Soviet-desijrned surface-to-air weapons and are designed to further en- 
hance the effectiveness of airpower. 


Through the initiatives I have mentioned and the continual exploitation of the 
inherent flexibility of air power, the aircraft remains a formidable and cost-ef- 
fective weapon system. 

F-15 OR F-16? 

Senator Cranston. Does the U.S. need to purchase so many complex and ex- 
pensive tactical fighters like the F-15, or would it be better served to invest more 
heavily in the simpler, cheaper F-16? "What is the appropriate mix? What cri- 
teria do you use in determining that mix ? 

General Jones. The USAF tactical fighter force is based on the objective of 
achieving a mix of capabilities which provides a balanced combination of quality 
and quantity. We are designing our force to meet the threat with both of these 
features, while remaining within projected fiscal constraints. Consequently, we 
are structuring our force within the concept of a high-low mix of systems. 

The F-15 is a highly sophisticated weapon system optimized for the demanding. 
all weather counter air mission. If fiscal constraints were not a driving factor 
in planning our fighter force, we would deploy the F-15 in sufficient numbers to 
meet the total threat. However, in light of projected fiscal constraints, current 
plans include development and procurement of the less sophisticated, lower cost 
F-16 which will complement the F-15 in performing the air superiority role. 

There are many factors which affect the size and structure of our fighter force, 
the most important being the projected threat and the postulated environment 
in which we will meet that threat. Our potential adversaries are developing and 
deploying more sophisticated air-to-air and ground attack aircraft, thus adding 
increased quality to their already established numerical advantage. Also, we see 
a marked change in Soviet doctrine, wherein they are placing increased emphasis 
on offensive operations by utilizing all weather attack aircraft similar to our 
F-lll. To meet this type of threat we must depend upon the F-15 with its so- 
phisticated avionics, radar missiles, and look down, shoot down capability 
against high speed, low altitude threats in adverse weather. 

Other factors affecting our force mix include, but are not limited to. forecast 
fiscal resource availability, initial procurement and life cycle costs, maintain- 
ability and capability of the^e aircraft, possible geographic areas of conflict, and 
the industrial capacity of our nation to rapidly produce sophisticated weapons 
systems when required. 

In consideration of these factors, the programmed deployment of six wings of 
F-15s is the minimum necessary to insure an adequate hedge against the threat 
in the more demanding portions of the counter-air mission. 


Senator Cranston. In testimony before the House Budget Committee on 
July 10. 1975. Assistant Secretary of Defense Leonard Sullivan stated. "Fifty per- 
cent of our airplanes are ready to fly at any one time. . . ." Is that statement 
an accurate picture of the readiness of Air Force aircraft? If so, doesn't this state 
reflect a major management problem and what specific steps are you taking to 
correct it? 

General Jones. Senator Cranston, the Air Force readiness at this time, in terms 
of flyable aircraft, is significantly greater than 50 percent. We have only minor 
isolated problems in meeting our peacetime training requirements. However, we 
do have some concern about our ability to deploy and sustain higher sortie and 
flying rates involved in wartime operations. This is due to a shortage of service- 
able spare parts for both peacetime ope ration and for war reserve requirements. 

Part of the current problem is caused by higher prices of spares and longer 
leadtimes for their delivery. Also, we have been unable to articulate to the Con- 
gress the requirement for war reserve materiel (WRM), and consequently have 
incurred congressional reductions in our budget requests for these spares. Per- 
haps the greatest impact on our current readiness relates to the reduced repair 
program for spares, caused by inflationary effects in the O&M accounts and by 
congressional cuts in FY 76. Thus, the backlog of unserviceable components is 

Improvement in our logistics support i>osture is planned in our budget for 
FY 1!>77. covering spares acquisition and especially the repair program. 


End FY 4/76 Position 




Military Airlift Command (MAC) - 
to maintain a constant state of readiness 


The mission of MAC is 

in the military airlift system for support of: 

strategic airlift deployment and supply operations; theater 

tactical airlift requirements during contingency/combat operations; 

and Air Force Rescue and Recovery and Air Weather Service. 


Altus, OK 
Dover, DE 
McChord, WA 
Pope, NC 

Norton, CA 
Scott, IL 
Lajes, Azores 
Travis. CA 

Charleston, SC 
Little Rock, AR 
McGuire-, NJ 
Rhein Main, Germany 

MANPOWER: (Current authorizations for FY 76 position) 

Officers: 11,581 Enlisted: '57,850 Civilian 




IXE£ • 

Sqdns Acft Auth 











- ■ 








HC-13 0/CHH-3 




4 Dets 















Acft Auth 





















♦These are Reserve Associate units which fly with active AF aircraft. 



End FY 4/76 Position 


Organizes, trains, equips, 
forces for aerospace combat 
reconnaissance and special missions. 


Strategic Air Command (SAC) 
administers, and prepares strategic 
, including offensive strikes, 


Andersen, Guam 
Beale, CA 
Car swell, TX 
Davis-Monthan , 
Ellsworth, ND 
Fairchild, WA 
Griffiss, NY 
K I Sawyer, MI 
Loring, ME 
March , CA 

Minot, ND 
Pease, NH 
Rickenbacker , OK 
Whiteman, MO 
Barksdale, LA 
Blytheville, AR 
Castle, CA 
Dyess, TX 
F E Warren, WY 

Grand Forks , ND 
Grissom, IN 
Kincheloe, MI 
Malmstrom, MN 
McConnell, KS 
Offutt, NE 
Plattsburgh, NY 
Vandenberg , CA 
Wurtsmith, MI 

MANPOWER : (Current authorizations for FY 76 position) 

Officers: 19,395 Enlisted: 89,774 Civilian: 19,306 





Acft Auth 





4 ^ 


KC-135 . 












DC- 130 








. 54 



Acft Auth 




End FY 4/76 Position 


Conducts aerospace defense operations according to tasks assigned 
by Commander-in-Chief, North American Air Defense Cor^-and/Aerospace 
Defense Command (CINCNORAD/CINCAD) and provides designated forces 
to CINCNORAD/CINCAD. A Joint Task Force (JTF) may be established 
for contingency operations, other than aerospace defense. 


Eielson, AK 

Elmendorf, AK 

Shemya , AK 

MANPOWER : (Current authorizations for FY 76 position) 

Officers: 784 Enlisted: 7,637 Civilian: 1,811 





Acft Auth 










Acft Auth 

End FY 4/76 Position 


Plans, conducts, controls, and coordinates offensive and defensive 
air operations in accordance with tasks assigned by the Commander- 
in-Chief, United States European Command (USCINCEUR) . 


Alconbury, UK 
Athenai, Greece 
Aviano, Italy 
Bentwaters, UK 
Bitburg, GE 
Cam* New Amsterdam, 

Hahn, GE ' 
Incirlik, TK 
Lakenheath, UK 
Mildenhall, UK 
Ramstein, GE 
Sembach, GE 

Spangdahlem, GE 
Torrejon, SP 
Upper Hey ford, UK 
Woodbridge, UK 
Zaragoza, SP 
Zweibrucken, GE 

MANPOWER : (Current authorizations for FY 76 position) 

Officers: 5,932 Enlisted: .39,652 Civilian: 11,244 





Acft Auth 

F-4 • 






" F-5 












AC- 130 



Sqdns Acft Auth 


End FY 4/76 Position 

Plans, conducts, controls, and coordinates offensive and defensive 
air operations in accordance with tasks assigned by the Commander- 
in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC) . 


Clark, PI 
Hick am, HI 
Kadena, Japan 
Korat, Thailand 
Kunsan, Korea 

Osan, Korea 
Taipei, Taiwan 
U Tapao, Thailand 
Wheeler, HI 
Yokota, Japan 

MANPOWE R: (Current authorizations for FY 76 position) 

Officers: 2,756 Enlisted: 21,245 Civilian: 9,643 





Acft Auth 










. 0-2 



0V- 1 



AC- 130 




Acft Auth 

F.nd FY 4/76 Position 


Organizes, equips, trains, administers, and operates forces assigned 
or attached to participate in prompt and sustained tactical air 
operations including tactical fighter, tactical air reconnaissance, 
special operations, tactical air control, and support units. 


Bergs trom, TX Howard, Panama Mt Home, ID 
Cannon, NM Langley, VA ' Myrtle Beach, 
Eglin 09, FL Luke, AZ Nellis, NV 
England, LA MacDill, FL Seymour Johns- 
George, CA Moodv, GA Shaw, SC 
Ho 12 oman, NM 
Homestead, FL 
MANPOVTER: (Current authorizations for FY 76 position) 


Officers: 10,386 

Enlisted: 65,906 

Civilian: 12,237 





Acft Auth 




A- 7 



















AC-'. 3 OH 












0-2 A 








KC-9 7 



Sqdns Acft Auth 






















, 0/6 
















End FY 4/76 Position 


MAJOR COMMAND AND MISSION : Aerospace Defense Command (ADCOM) - 
The mission of the Aerospace Defense is to discharge 
United States Air Force responsibilities for aerospace defense 
of the United States and to provide forces for defense of over- 
sea land areas as required. 


Duluth, MN Tyndall, FL 

Hancock, NY Keflavik, Iceland 
Peterson. CO 

MANPOWER: (Current authorizations for FY 7 6 position) 

Officers: 3,564 Enlisted: 20,902 Civilian: 5,316 



T^pe Sqdns Ac ft Auth 








; 113 








Sqdns A< 

sft Auth 



90/0 " 
• 0/6 


Brief Description of Air Fobce Major Acquisition Programs 

B-l. — The B-l is being developed to provide an effective weapon system for 
modernization of the bomber portion of the strategic forces so that the United 
States can maintain strategic sufficiency and force effectiveness in the 1980s and 
beyond. The B-l is a medium gross weight bomber, characterized by variable 
swept wings, four turbofan engines, a four man crew, and a flexible avionics sub- 
system. Its three weapons bays with 75.0001b internal capacity permits maximum 
carriage flexibility for nuclear air-to-surface missiles, nuclear or conventional 
gravity weapons, fuel, or penetration aids. The primary mission of the B-l is low 
level penetration of sophisticated enemy defenses at high subsonic speed. The 
fast start, short take-off distance, high climb-out rate, and nuclear hardening 
of the B-l make it highly survivable in an attack on U.S. bases. The first de- 
velopment aircraft is currently in flight test and is successfully proving the B-l's 
potential to perform its operational mission. The B-l production decision is cur- 
rently scheduled for November. 1976. The Air Force requests for long lead pro- 
curement funds do not constitute a commitment to. or approval of production. 
These funds will only be used to permit the Air Force to transition from B-l 
development to production in a more efficient manner at substantially lower total 
program cost. 

E-SA (AWACS). — The Airborne Warning and Control System is a Boeing 
707-320B with an integrated suite of avionics. AWACS possesses the unique 
ability to provide timely and accurate intelligence, warning and communications 
which are essential to prevent or control conflict. It is recognized by both the 
U.S. Department of Defense and NATO as a major advance in command and 
control capability not only for air forces but for forces on the land and sea as 
well. This command and control capability has a synergistic effect which allows 
the most effective application of high cost weapon systems in either a potential 
or actual conflict. AWACS overcomes the line of sight/terrain blocking surveil- 
lance limitations inherent in other systems and permits surveillance of both 
high and low flying targets. The ability to detect aircraft flying at low altitude 
over land or water makes a significant contribution to the effective integration 
of air forces to defend the continental United States, support NATO require- 
ments, and meet contingencies throughout the world. The design and mobility 
of the system give it an inherent survivability to attack and resistivity to 
electronic countermeasures. The first six aircraft are in production and delivery 
should begin in November, 1976. AWACS is planned to be operational by Sep- 
tember. 1977. 

F-15. — The F-15 "Eagle"' is an advanced tactical fighter designed specifically 
for superiority in air-to-air combat. Its twin engine, high thrust-to-weight ratio 
and low wing load characteristics, provide outstanding turning ability, accelera- 
tion, and agility. The F-15 employs long range, pulse doppler. look down radar: 
carries armament of 4 AIM-7F and 4 AIYI-9L missiles ; and 20mm cannon with 
940 rounds of ammunition. The F-15 also has the versatility to be effective in 
air-to-ground missions. 7,000 hours have been flown on F-15 aircraft, of which 
4.000 are in the test program. Twenty-seven operational F-15s have been de- 
livered to the Tactical Air Command. Procurement is continuing towards an 
operation force of 729 aircraft. 

F-16. — The F-16 is a multimission single place, single engine fighter, incorpo- 
rating advanced technology features which enhance total system performance. 
The objective of the F-16 program is to develop a fighter which can perform a 
wide range of tactical air warfare tasks at reduced life cycle costs, thus per- 
mitting procurement of the quantities of aircraft required to meet force structure 
requirements. The F-16 will have exceptional close-in air-to-air combat capability 
to complement the F-15. and with inherent design characteristics, to be a potent 
air-to-ground weapon system. The F-16 utilizes the same engine as the F-15, 
exploits advanced aerodynamic features for increased maneuverability and re- 
duced drag and incorporates a high visibility/high "G" cockpit with a 30° re- 
clined ejection seat and a fly-by-wire fligbt control system. The selection of the 
F-16 by the European Consortium will lead to significant standardization within 
NATO. Tbe prototype YF 16 aircraft have completed more than 550 flights (630 
hours of flight). Construction of the first developmental F-16 aircraft is well 
underway. A production decision is currently scheduled for September. 1977. 

A- 10.— Tbe A-10 is an attack aircraft specific-ally designed and optimized for 
support of ground forces. Dedicated ground support is needed in light of the 


numerical superiority in manpower and armor of Warsaw Pact ground units 
which confront NATO forces. The A-10 is a twin turbofan, single place aircraft, 
characterized by large payload carrying capability, long loiter lime and a high 
degree of maneuverability, survivability, and weapon delivery accuracy. It is 
hardened to survive 23mm High Explosive Incendiary (HEX) rounds, and Armor 
Piercing Incendiary (API) rounds. The A-10 also contains electronic counter- 
measures and infrared countermeasures for increased survivability in a high 
threat environment. This aircraft is designed to carry an ordnance load of 16,000 
lbs, has the 30mm gun with the API heavy metal penetrator for effective anti- 
armor (tank) kill, can operate from forward airstrips, and has a ferrying range 
of 2,600 miles. The first production A-10 is scheduled for delivery in November, 
1! >75. The initial operational capability for the first operational A-10 squadron 
is January, 1978. 

Advanced Airborne Command Post (AABNCP). — The AABNCP (designated 
The E— 1) is a modified Boeing 717 aircraft specially equipped to serve as the 
National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) for the National Com- 
mand Authorities (NCA) and supporting staff, and as the Headquarters Stra- 
tegic Air Command ( SAC i Airborne Command Post. The AABNCP will accom- 
modate a larger battle staff and will have significantly improved command, 
control and communications (C3) equipment compared to the present EC-135 
Airborne Command Posts. The AABNCP will provide a modernized, highly sur- 
vivable capability for command and control of our strategic forces during all 
phases of a general war. Four of the six AABNCP required have been procured : 
two of these are currently operational at Andrews AFB. Command, Control and 
Communications equipment testing is continuing, and full operational capability 
is scheduled for early 1983. 

MINUTEMAN. — Minuternan lis and Ills are three stage solid propellant 
intercontinental ballistic missiles which are guided to their targets by all-inertial 
guidance and control systems. The missiles are deployed in hardened and dis- 
persed underground silos. The missiles can be launched from ground control 
facilities or by the Airborne Launch Control System. With the improved third 
stage and the post boost vehicle, the Minuternan III missile can deliver multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV> and their penetration aids to 
multiple targets. The capability of this weapon system has been continually 
enhanced over the years through the Force Modernization Program, which con- 
sists of improvements in ground equipment, airborne subsystems, and command 
and control. The Air Force is continuing the Force Modernization Program and 
buying additional Minuternan III test missiles. 

MA\~ER1CK. — MAVERICK is an air-to-surface missile designed for use 
against stationary or moving small, hard targets such as tanks, armored vehicles, 
and field fortifications. The MAVERICK missiles achieve a low cost per kill by 
increasing aircraft suvivability through launch and leave capability, multiple 
carriage on a single aircraft and high probability of hit. Current production of 
MAVERICKs consists of the basic television and Scene Magnification electro- 
optical guidance versions. Development of imaging infrared (IIR) and laser 
seekers as modular guidance heads for the MAVERICK airframe wall provide the 
MAVERICK weapon system capability for day/night/reduced visibility opera- 
tions. The addition of new seeker hardware under development to the low 7 cost 
MAVERICK airframe is needed to enhance our Tactical Force's close air support 
and interdiction capability. 

Sparrow (AIM-7F). — The AIM-7F is a joint service acquistion program with 
the Navy to provide an all-weather. all-asi>eet. day-night missile for tactical em- 
ployment at medium to short ranges in air-to-air fighter combat. This missile, a 
solid state improvement over the AIM-7E, provides for increased performance in 
the areas of reliability, range, lethality, clutter rejection and countermeasures. 
The AIM-7F will be the primary radar air-to-air missile for the F-15. F-15/ 
AIM-F7 development, test and evaluation is ongoing. Procurement will be in 
support of operational and War Reserve Material ( WRM) requirements. 

Sidewinder (AIM-9L). — The AIM-9L is a joint Navy/AF program to develop 
and acquire an improvede air-to-air dogfight missile. The AIM-9L will provide 
an expanded operational capability in the short range combat encounters. The 
improved reliability of the AIM-9L will reduce the size of the War Reserve 
Material (WRM) requirement and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs. 
The missile is presently scheduled for use on the F-15 and the F-16, and is under 


consideration for us on the F-4E. AIM-9L Initial Operational Test and Evalu- 
ation is underway and production release (DSARC III) is scheduled for 
January. 1976. 

SHRIKE ( AG M -45). —The AGM-45 SHRIKE is composed of a family of 
anti-radiation missiles designed for the detection and suppression/destruction 
of enemy radars. It is operationally employed with F-105G, F-4C, and will 
deployed with F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft. The missile will passively home on 
emitting radar signals. Target destruction is accomplished with a fragmenting 
warhead. Current and future 'SHRIKE procurements will be in support of War 
Reserve Material (WRM) requirements. 

Biography of Gen. David C. Jones, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force 

General David C. Jones was appointed Chief of Staff of the United States Air 
Force on July 1, 1974. As Chief of Staff, he manages a worldwide organization of 
men and women employing the world's most advanced defense systems, and is 
responsible for the. administration, training, and equipping of these forces. Con- 
currently, he is a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who are the principal mili- 
tary advisors to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary 
of Defense. 

Drawing from a widely varied career, General Jones brings to his position a 
wealth of experience and knowledge of the diversified activities of the U.S. Air 
Force. His assignments have included operational and command positions in 
bomber, tanker, training, and tactical fighter units as well as service in staff posi- 
tions in the Strategic Air Command and Headquarters U.S. Air Force. 

In combat, General Jones was assigned to a bombardment squadron during the 
Korean War and accumulated over 300 hours on missions over North Korea. In 
1969. he served in the Republic of Vietnam as Deputy Commander for Operations 
and then Vice Commander of Seventh Air Force. 

General Jones' intimacy with the NATO alliance and its complex multinational 
defense structure is based on a range of assignments which cover the spectrum of 
planning and operational responsibilities. Having served as inspector, operator, 
planner and Commander in Chief of United States Air Forces in Europe 
(USAFE), he has dealt with every facet of the diversified missions of military 
forces committed to Europe. Concurrent with duty as Commander in Chief 
USAFE, General Jones was Commander of the Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force. 

General Jones was born at Aberdeen, S. Dak. He graduated from high school in 
Minot, N. Dak., in 1939 and attended the University of North Dakota and Minot 
State College until the outbreak of World War II. General Jones entered the 
Army Air Corps, beginning aviation cadet training in April 1942, and receiving 
his commission and pilot wings in February 1943. A graduate of the National 
War College. General Jones was awarded an honorary doctorate of humane let- 
ters degree from the University of Nebraska at Omaha in 1974. 

General Jones is married to the former Lois M. Tarbell of Rugby, N. Dak. They 
have three children. 

A. Personal Data 

1. Born, July 9, 1921, Aberdeen, S. Dak. ; father, Maurice Jones ; mother, Helen 

2. Married, January 23, 1942; wife, Lois M. Tarbell: children, Susan. Kathy, 
and David. 

3. Hometown. Minot. N. Dak. 

Ii. Education 

1. Graduate, high school, Minot. N. Dak.. 1939. 

2. Attended University of North Dakota and Minot State College. 

3. Graduate, Flying School. Roswell, N. Mex.. 1943. 

4. National War College, Washington, D.C., 19f>0. 

('. Service 

1. April 1942-February 1943: Avn. cadet, Roswell, N. Mex. 

2. February 1943-August 194.") : Adv. fly. instr.. Roswell. N. Mex. : Yuma. Ariz. : 
Pecos. Tex. : and Hobbs. X. Mex. 

3. August 1945-May 1948: Pit., ops. off., tng. off., and later Comdr., 3d Emerg. 
Resc. Sq., 5th AF. Japan. 

4. May 1948-January 1949: Unit instr., 2236th AFRes Tng. Cen.. Godman Fid.. 


5. January 1949-April 1949: Stu., Air Tac. Sch., Tyndall AFB. Fla. 

6. April 1949-August 1949: Stu., Atomic Energy Crs., Keesler AFB. Miss. 

7. August 1949-October 1949: Asst. Ops, and Tag. Off., Godman AFB, Ky. 

8. October 1949-January 1950: Stu.. Spec Wpns. Crs.. Sandia Base, X. Mex. 

9. January 1950-May 1953: Pit., ops. off., later Comdr., 19th Bomb Sq., March 
AFB. Calif. 

10. May 1953 June 1954: Comdr.. 22d Air Rflg. Sq., March AFB. Calif. 

11. June 1954-September 1954: Comdr., 33d Bomb Sq., March AFB. Calif. 
ll'. September 1954— December 1954 : Ops. planner, Bomber Mission Br., Hq. 

SAC. Offutt AFB, Xebr. 

13. January 1955- July 1957: Aide to CINC, SAC. Offutt AFB, Xebr. 

14. July 1957— July 1959: Dir. of Mat., later Dep. Comdr. for Maint, 93d 
Bomb. Wg., Castle AFB. Calif. 

15. August 1959-June 1960: stu.. Xational War College, Washington, D.C. 

16. July 1960-July 1964 : Ch., Manned Sys. Br. ; Dep. Ch., Strat. Div. ; later 
Ch., Strat. Div.. DCS. Ops., Hq. CSAF, Washington. D.C. 

17. August 1964-February 1965: Stu.. USAF Ops. Tug. Crs., Luke AFB and 
Davis-Monthan AFB, Ariz. 

18. March 1965-October 1965: Comdr., 33d Tac. Ftr. Wg., Eglin AFB, Fla. 

19. October 1965-January 1967: IG. Hq. USAFE, Wiesbaden, Germany. 

20. January 1967-June 1967: CofS. Hq. USAFE. Wiesbaden, Germany. 

21. June 1967-January 1969: DCS., Plans & Ops., Hq. USAFE, Wiesbaden. 

22. February 1969-June 1969: DCS. Ops.. Hq. 7th AF, Tan Son Xhut And., 
Republic of Vietnam. 

23. June 1969-July 1969: Vice Comdr.. 7th AF. Tan Son Xhut And., Republic 
of Vietnam. 

24. August 1969-April 1971 : Comdr., 2d AF, Barksdale AFB, La. 

25. April 1971-August 1971: Vice CINC, USAFE. Wiesbaden, Germany. 

26. September 1971-June 1974: CINC, USAFE. Wiesbaden. Germany (Ram- 
stein. Germany after March 1973) and Comdr., 4th ATAF, Ramstein AB, 

27. July 1974-prcsent : Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. 

D. Decorations and Service Awards 
Distinguished Service Medal w/1 oak Vietnam Service Medal w/1 service 

leaf cluster star 

Legion of Merit Air Force Longevity Service Award 

Distinguished Flying Cross Ribbon w/6 oak leaf clusters 

Bronze Star Medal Xational Order, Republic of Vietnam, 

Air Medal w/1 oak leaf cluster Fifth Class 

Air Force Commendation Medal Republic of Vietnam Air Force Dis- 

Air Force Outstanding Unit Award tinguished Service Order, First Class 

Ribbon United Nations Service Medal 

American Campaign Medal Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal 

Asiatic-Pacific Campaign Medal Grand Cross w/star and shoulder board 

World War II Victory Medal of The Order of Merit of the Federal 

Army of Occupation Medal (Japan) Republic of Germany 

Xational Defense Service Medal w/1 MLssileman Badge 

service star 
Korean Service Medal w/2 service stars 


Grade Temporary Permanent 

2d lieutenant Feb. 6, 1943 Feb. 6, 1943. 

1st lieutenant Feb. 28, 1944. Feb. 6, 1946. 

Captain Apr. 11, 1946. Oct. 25, 1948 

Major Feb. 5, 1951, _ Jan. 23, 1952. 

Lieutenant colonel June 1, 1953.. July 1, 1959. 

Colonel Apr. 23, 1957. Dec. 22, 1960 

Brigadier general Dec. 1, 1965_. Feb. 10, 1966. 

Major general Nov. 1,1967.. Jan. 24, 1969. 

Lieutenant general Aug. 1, 1969.. 

General (date of rank Sept. 1, 1971) Sept. 1, 1971.. 



Aerospace Defense Command 73 

Combat forces 73 

Major installations 73 

Manpower 73 

Aircraft and missiles : 

A-7 24 

A-10 10,21,62,63,74 

Projected cost 11 

Structural stress problems 11 

Sufficient speed 11 

AABNCP (E-4) 75 

AW ACS (E-3A) 57,74 

B-l 26, 57, 74 

Amounts needed 27 

Two reasons to proceed 27 

B-52 alert rates, reduction in 60 

C-15 58 

Fatigue life 59 

Weight and payload require- 
ments 59 

F-4 24,58 

F-16 21,63,66,74 

Fuselage size 23 

Major changes 22 

Projected costs 22 

Radar 23 

F-15 24.58,62.66,74 

F-lll 23 

Fifty percent ready to fly 66 



Sheltered in Europe 27 

SHRIKE (AGM-45) 76 

Sidewinder (AIM-9L) 75 

Sparrow (AIM-7F) 75 

Tanker cargo 10 

UE, additional 296 required 62 

Alaskan Air Command 69 

Combat forces 69 

Major installations 69 

Manpower 69 

Coordination and cooperation 7 

Defense 2,60 

Four tactical air forces 6, 21 

Some duplication 6 

Ground-to-air missiles, fighter loss- 
es to 65 

Growth, urgent need for 2 

Management initiatives 5 

Military Aircraft Command 67 

Major installations 67 

Manpower 67 

Combat forces 67 

Missiles (See Aircraft and missiles i ?&& 

Mission 3, 7, 23, 64 

Army aviation 64 

Forward defense 3 

Information, intelligence, con- 
trol, communications 4 

Lines of communication 3 

Marine Corps aviation 64 

Mobility 4 

Navy aviation 64 

Strategic balance 3 

Mutual Training 6 

Needless duplication and the serv- 
ice air forces 64 

Operation and maintenance : 

Aircraft maintenance costs 18 

^ Broader career field training— 20 

Certain requirements 18 

Changes being made 18 

Experience level 18 

Man-hour comparison 19 

Overmaintenance 19 

Productivity measures 19 

Queen Bee program 19 

Airline/manufacturer mainte- 
nance program 27, 56 

Development of maintenance 
programs : 
Aircraft engine analysis 

method 41 

Aircraft structure analysis 

method 39 

Aircraft system/component 

analysis method 33 

Program development admin- 
istration 45 

Program requirement 30 

Scheduled maintenance pro- 
gram content 32 

Supporting technical data__ 46 
Direct and adverse effect on 

operating safety 53 

General : 

Introduction 29 

Objective 29 

Organization 29 

Scope 29 

Glossary 48 

Hidden functions, explanation 

of 54 

MSG—2 decision diagram 50 

Structure analysis method 51 

Structure detectability evalua- 
tion 52 





3 1262 09112 4866 

Operation and .Maintenance — Con. Page 

Animal costs 7 

Base closings 20 

Five-year projected budget 21, 22 

Five-percent cut -1 

Five-percent increase '22 

Flight pay 12. 16 

Based on hours and months of 

flying time 17 

Determined by rank 16 

Percentage 16 

Pilots in lower ranks .16 

Save-pay provision ' — 14, 16 

Increase, result of inflation 7 

Intelligence budget 20 

Pacific Air Forces 71 

Combat forces 71 

.Major installations 71 

Manpower 71 

Personnel : 

Air Force well managed 57 

Colonels, reduction of 15 

Defense Manpower Personnel 

Act 15 

Fewer i>eople, accommodation 

with 6 

Flight pay. number of officers 

receiving 12, 16 

Officers actually riving 12 

Reduction in number 14 

Save-pay provision 14. 16 

Force requirements 8 

Headquarters cut 5 

Manpower planning 56 

Pilots 15. 17 

Proper balance, need of 15 

Quality people and systems 4 

Reduction-in-force 14. »;i 

Reserve forces, greater re- 
liance on 5 


Retirement encouraged 15 

Pilot training, cost of 11, 17 

Modernization causes retraining. 12 

PRAM program 58 

Program alternative 59 

Purchasing power erosion 4 

"Quiet Revolution" 62,63 

Role in European war 9 

Airlift program 9 

NATO territory, prevent loss of_ 9 

Service's real growth desire v. Pres- 
ident's 61 

Soviet airpower, growth in 25 


Forward area, new systems in — 25 

FOXBAT i 25 

Strategic Air Command 68 

Combat forces 68 

Major installations 68 

Manpower 68 

Tactical Air Command 72 

Combat forces 72 

Major installations 72 

Manpower 72 

U.S. Air Forces in Europe 70 

Combat forces 70 

Major installations 70 

Manpower 70 

Vladivostok Accords 25 

Bomber force, modernize 25 

Mobile ICBM's 26 

Proper balance, United States 

should maintain 25 

Soviet warheads, effect of 26 

Strategic cruise missiles 26 

Wings, number of 24 

Options 24